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1. Introduction 
One of the cornerstones of market efficiency is the principle that trading strategies derived from 
public information should “not work.” Over the past 35 years, evidence has accumulated about anomalies 
that seem to violate this maxim. Investments linked to momentum, earnings surprises, stock issuance, 
accruals, credit risk, profitability, book-to-market, and a host of other signals have earned risk-adjusted 
profits in the past.1 However, the motivation for studying these signals is not always apparent.2 
In contrast, the motivation for studying whether fundamental analysis “works” is more obvious. 
Fundamental analysis is based on the principle that stocks have an intrinsic fair value and that investors can 
earn abnormal profits from stock-specific signals that indicate deviations from fair value. Abnormal profits 
arise from convergence to fair value – at one extreme via short-term term price movements towards fair 
value, or more slowly, via distributions of dividends, takeovers, private buyouts, or asset liquidation. 
Alternatively, to profit from fundamental analysis, one merely has to subscribe to the seemingly plausible 
hypothesis that share prices are more likely to converge to fair value than diverge from it. 
Most studies of fundamental analysis require highly stylized models of fair values. For example, 
discounted cash flow models of fundamental value require near-term forecasts of cash flows, short-term 
and long-term cash flow growth rates, and proper discount rates. The researcher’s broad discretion over the 
choice of model and its parameters makes it difficult to assess whether fundamental analysis really works 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Ball and Brown (1968), Jones and Litzenberger (1970), Joy, Litzenberger, and McEnally (1977), 
Rendleman, Jones, and Latané (1982), Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Fama 
and French (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995), Sloan (1996), Ball and Bartov (1996), Dichev (1998), Fama and French (2006), Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Phillipov (2009), and 
Novy-Marx (2013). 
2 Both behavioral and risk-based hypotheses have been advanced to explain anomalies like these, but the explanations 
have generally been developed after the fact. For example, overconfidence and the disposition effect are offered as 
behavioral explanations for momentum; return covariation within the value and growth categories, embodied in the 
HML factor, is proposed as a risk-based explanation for the value premium. See Fama and French (1993), Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Grinblatt and Han (2005). 
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or if the observed abnormal profits are the outcome of a data snooping exercise.3 In contrast, the researcher 
can plausibly argue that it is truly the deviations of market prices from fair value that underlie the 
predictability of future returns only with a more agnostic and less discretionary approach to fundamentals-
based equity valuation. 
Despite the popularity of the stylized approaches to fair value assessment, fundamental analysis 
does not necessarily require explicit cash flow forecasts and discount rates. These forecasts and discount 
rates can be implicit in a variety of other approaches that obviate the need for explicit models and parameter 
estimates. Our particularly simple and agnostic approach to fundamental analysis approximates a 
company’s fair equity value as a linear function of virtually all of its most recently reported income 
statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement items. Our only restriction is that the function’s 
coefficients, which are determined each month and the same across firms, offer the lowest degree of 
mispricing (as measured by variance) of a randomly selected investment dollar in the economy that month. 
The term “peer-implied fair value” seems appropriate here as each firm’s fair value prediction is based on 
contemporaneous valuations of all firms in the stock market. 
This more direct approach to fair value estimation is consistent with the most basic principles of 
asset pricing theory and turns out to be exceedingly simple to implement: each month’s peer-implied fair 
values are the predictions of monthly cross-sectional regressions of market capitalizations on all firm-level 
accounting items with broad coverage across firms. The accounting items are known to market participants 
at the time according to Compustat’s Point-In-Time (PIT) data set, which we exclusively use throughout 
the study. Regression residuals identify which firms’ market capitalizations deviate from month-specific 
                                                     
3 The literature notes that return predictability and contemporaneous correlations between returns and risk-adjustment 
factors could be the spurious outcome of specification search, data snooping, sample selection bias, and repeated 
hypothesis testing. See, for example, Kogan and Tian (2013), McLean and Pontiff (2016), Schulmeister (2009), 
Sullivan, Timmerman, and White (1999), Foster, Smith, and Whaley (1997), Fama (1991), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
Heckman (1979), and Leamer (1978). Studies that examine return predictors in out-of-sample periods do not 
necessarily resolve the data snooping dilemma, since the specific anomalies studied are highly correlated with other 
anomalies known to work in the same out-of-sample periods. 
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valuation norms that are attached to a firm’s accounting statement. The market portfolio is fairly valued at 
all times because regression estimates with a constant force the sum of the residuals to zero.4 
This alternative approach to fundamental analysis is unorthodox, but it helps avoid the temptation 
to data snoop across model specifications and parameter estimates. The theorist’s license in more traditional 
fundamental analysis is best suspended when it offers too much discretion over implementation, potentially 
yielding significant results by chance. In contrast, predicting fair value as a statistics-constrained linear 
function of all widely reported accounting items prevents discretion in the selection or weighting of 
accounting items that could conceivably relate to future returns. 
After identifying peer-implied values from linear functions of accounting items, we study the 
profitability of buying undervalued and selling overvalued securities - measured from the percentage 
deviation of a stock’s peer-implied value estimate from it actual market capitalization. Cross-sectional 
regressions of returns on firm attributes and dummies for quintile ranks, as well as time-series regressions 
of mispricing-sorted portfolio returns on factors assess whether this agnostic take on fundamental analysis 
offers a profitable investment strategy. We control for industry returns, beta, book-to-market ratios, 
momentum, short- and long-term reversals, firm size, gross profitability, accruals, earnings surprises, 
earnings yield, and a host of 12 other known anomalies, including alternative mispricing estimates. The 
abnormal return (alpha) spreads between portfolios of the extreme quintiles of stocks sorted on percentage 
misvaluation are between 4% and 10% per year, depending on the risk adjustment procedure used, positive 
in almost 60% of the 310 months studied, and prevalent in large and small firms (although value weighting 
cuts risk-adjusted alphas by about 1/3). The mispricing regressor is of similar significance as momentum, 
                                                     
4 Note that our approach only measures relative valuation, but not absolute valuation, i.e. even if the market portfolio 
is fairly valued on a relative basis, the market as a whole may be overvalued or undervalued on an absolute basis at 
each point in time, such as during the internet bubble of the late 1990s. 
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and it surpasses the greater significance hurdles suggested by Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) and by Green, 
Hand, and Zhang (2013).5 
Despite the handicaps imposed, our statistician’s approach to valuation has theoretical roots in the 
most intuitive of principles that guide fair value: the law of one price. Like fair values obtained from any 
asset pricing model, the values obtained with our approach are the market values of synthetic stocks or 
replicating portfolios6 – “replicating” because each of the latter portfolios’ fundamental characteristics are 
identical to those of the firm being valued. Because the number of firms N is large relative to the rank K of 
an NxK matrix X of all firms’ accounting data at a given date, an infinite number of portfolios replicate the 
accounting data of the firm being valued. Each has a distinct market price that represents an estimate of the 
target firm’s fair value. However, as Appendix A proves, among all these fair value candidates, our unique 
value prediction and the replicating portfolio matrix attached to it can be deduced from three appealing 
assumptions: 
1) The NxN replicating portfolio matrix has weights on stocks that make the average valuation error 
zero (forcing the market portfolio to appear fairly priced in relative terms each month). 
2) The replicating portfolio matrix has weights that are functions only of the K-dimensional 
accounting information and are not functions of firms’ market capitalizations, returns, or other 
variables besides the accounting information. 
                                                     
5 In Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), newly discovered factors should clear a t-ratio of 3.00. Green, Hand, and Zhang 
(2013) study more than 330 anomalies and argue that controlling for a subset of existing factors is sufficient for 
researchers discovering a new predictive factor. 
6 As Ross (1978, p. 455) noted, even the simplest discounting of risk-free cash flows is a comparison between the 
traded price of a quantity of risk-free bonds available in securities markets and an asset that produces a future risk-
free cash flow. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), a stock’s fairly valued replicating portfolio is a scaling 
of the market portfolio and risk free asset with the same beta as the stock. In continuous-time asset pricing, fairly 
priced Arrow-Debreu securities, constructed from dynamic portfolios of fairly priced assets, generate the probability-
weighted pricing kernels used to obtain fair values of all assets. And even when parameters like risk aversion are 
estimated from experiments, the lotteries used to obtain those parameters are deemed to be fairly valued. 
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3) The replicating portfolio matrix minimizes the average squared deviation across securities of any 
attribute (including market capitalization) not spanned by the K-dimensional accounting attributes. 
The set of replicating portfolio weights satisfying the above criteria forms an NxN idempotent 
projection matrix X(XTX)-1XT, tied to the cross-sectional regression described above. 
Note that the idempotent projection matrix, and hence the weights of the replicating portfolios, are 
constructed without regard for any firm’s market capitalization. The accounting variable regressors would 
generate the same idempotent matrix of replicating portfolio weights if, instead of fitting market 
capitalization, it was designed to fit earnings growth rates, age of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the 
returns of a stock,7 or the latitude of the firm’s headquarters. Despite market capitalization’s nonexistent 
role in the replicating portfolio, the market values of the replicating portfolios capture all of the dynamics 
of the relationship between the actual market values of firms and their accounting variables. And, in contrast 
to prior studies that predict returns from specific variables of interest, like Price-to-Earnings, Dividend 
Yield, or Market-to-Book ratios, our valuation approach has little discretion attached to its variables of 
interest. We are interested in all accounting variables, and any discretion we demonstrate to estimate fair 
values is based purely on standard statistical criteria – especially, data availability. 
Convergence of market prices to their peer-implied fair value is the most likely source of the 
profitability we uncover from this trading strategy. Admittedly, higher discount rates imply low market 
values and vice versa, other things equal.8 The mechanical relationship in the cross-section between market 
values (or ratios involving market values such as book-to-market) and expected returns applies to our signal, 
as it does to many others in the anomalies literature. However, the mere existence of such a mechanical 
relationship does not identify whether the observed return spreads, tied to this type of anomaly, are due to 
                                                     
7 See, for example, Bessembinder, Cooper, and Zhang (2015). 
8 This point was elegantly made by Ball (1978), Berk (1995), and the clean surplus accounting arguments in Fama 
and French (2006) and Novy-Marx (2013). 
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differences in risk or to pricing errors. We present evidence suggesting that convergence to fair value, rather 
than risk differences, accounts for the efficacy of our mispricing signal. In particular, the mispricing signal 
has no strong relations to known risk factors, the signal ranks decay more quickly than risk attributes, and 
the signal efficacy decays to zero over the subsequent 34 months.9 
Our approach to fair value estimation, conveniently referred to as the “statistician’s approach” to 
fundamental analysis, is deliberately crude and made even cruder by the accounting inputs used. The cross-
sectional regression essentially uses all balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement items 
reported by sufficient numbers of firms. The large numbers of highly (or perfectly) collinear variables 
implies that coefficient signs will flip month-to-month and many of the variables lack any unique coefficient 
because they are redundant. More precise ways of obtaining fair values certainly exist, but our goal is to be 
conservative at assessing whether a crude form of fundamental analysis works. The peer-implied fair value 
approach used here is unlikely to be a superior mousetrap for capturing the intrinsic values of securities. 
However, if the crude statistician’s approach to fundamental analysis works, then more accurate ways of 
measuring mispricing should work even better. 
With this in mind, we apply the same model, but also estimate fair values with an alternative to 
least squares on all firms that is more robust to outliers. This alternative is inspired by the estimator 
developed by Theil (1950) and Sen (1968) (TS henceforth) that is based on median coefficients across a 
large number of perfectly fit slopes from subsets of the sample. Given the high correlations between the 
regressors, the coefficients and thus their median are not uniquely identified in our setting. We address this 
issue by adapting the TS methodology to the median fair value for each firm, which is uniquely identified, 
as opposed to using the median coefficients to derive the predictions. As a more robust and presumably 
better estimation technique, the firm’s median fair value prediction should give more accurate predictions 
                                                     
9 Our approach has similarities to pairs trading strategies, as popularized by Gatev, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst, 
2006). However, in contrast to pairs trading, our strategy does not invest in the replicating portfolio, which is only 
used as a peer-implied valuation benchmark for each stock. 
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of its true fair value in each month. The paper’s TS-inspired estimates of fair value generally lead to higher 
trading profits than least squares estimates derived from one regression fit to all firms that month (referred 
to as the OLS prediction). However, both estimators of fair value generate significantly positive alphas.10 
2. Related literature 
Direct study of whether the estimation of fair market values per se leads to trading strategies that 
can earn abnormal profits is rare. Bhojraj and Lee (2002), Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2002), and Cooper 
and Lambertides (2014) study the relative valuation of target and comparable firms in the context of 
multiples valuation. However, Cooper and Lambertides (2014) find no evidence of predictability, and the 
other two papers do not investigate whether mispricing can be used to generate profitable trading strategies. 
Notable exceptions to the dearth of direct research on whether fundamental analysis works are 
studies that estimate fair value from the residual income model, including Ohlson (1990, 1991, 1995), 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999), and particularly Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee, Myers, and 
Swaminathan (1999). Frankel and Lee (1998) show that deviations from fair value predict long-term returns, 
especially between 24 and 36 months after receiving the mispricing signal. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan 
(1999) show that ratios of fair value to price predict the Dow 30 index. These papers differ from ours in 
their use and discretionary implementation of a specific theoretical model of intrinsic value (which requires 
analyst forecasts, aggregation and extrapolations of the forecasts, and discount rates). By contrast, we do 
not require discretionary decisions about how to aggregate analyst forecasts, or about how income growth 
rates and discount rates vary over time, forecast horizons, and firms. In this sense, our statistician’s approach 
to fair value estimation may be theoretically consistent with the residual income model, but is conceptually 
                                                     
10 We also consider valuation regressions without an intercept. While these models no longer ensure that the market 
portfolio is fairly priced at each point in time, they do have the appealing feature that firms with zero values for all 
accounting items have a valuation of zero. Risk-adjusted quintile spreads for the resulting misvaluation signals are 
essentially the same (TS estimate of fair value) or somewhat to moderately stronger (OLS estimate of fair value) 
without a constant than with a constant. 
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distinct from the implementation of these models in the literature. Moreover, our mispricing signal retains 
predictive power after controlling for these alternative estimates of mispricing.11 
A large number of studies predict stock returns using information from financial statements (e.g., 
investment/sales), often combined into a ratio with the firm’s stock price (e.g., dividend yield). In fact, 
research on anomalies has identified more than 333 known predictors of future returns, of which many are 
based on items from accounting statements.12 The closest to a study of fundamental analysis using a large 
number of accounting variables is Ou and Penman (1989). Ou and Penman (1989) analyze accounting 
variables as predictors of future earnings changes and show that the logit-estimated probability of an 
earnings increase forecasts stock returns. Holthausen and Larcker (1992) show that the Ou-Penman 
methodology can be improved by weighting the same accounting variables to best predict returns (but not 
earnings) out-of-sample. 
In another example, Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) study the April to March returns of firms with 
December fiscal year ends and find that the weighted averages of the ranks for changes in nine accounting 
variables predict a firm’s return.13 They select discretionary accounting constructs and weights solely 
because they predict returns in sample, not because the accounting constructs offer an estimate of a firm’s 
fair value. While these studies are like ours in that they predict returns from accounting data, the signals are 
not based on deviations of intrinsic value estimates from market prices. Even with the Ou and Penman 
(1989) paper, there is no a priori reason to think that a high probability of an earnings increase would lead 
to a high return unless the market was forecasting a lower earnings increase probability. There is no direct 
                                                     
11 In the same vein, Manaster and Rendleman (1982) show that deviations of observed stock prices from equilibrium 
stock prices implied in option prices predict future returns for a sample of 172 U.S. stocks. Deviations from fair 
value have also been used to study misvaluation and Q theories of M&A activity and agency costs, based on residual 
income valuation (e.g. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006) or (annual, industry-level) cross-sectional 
regressions of valuation metrics (Tobin’s Q, market capitalization) on determinants of fundamental value (e.g. 
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2005). 
12 See, for example, Green, Hand, and Zhang (2013), Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), and McLean and Pontiff (2016). 
13 Related papers include Greig (1992), Holthausen and Larcker (1992), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1997), Piotroski (2000), Mohanram (2005), and Piotroski and So (2012). 
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evidence of the market’s earnings forecast in the Ou and Penman (1989) paper; the only indirect evidence 
that it is lower -- the high return achieved -- does not survive beyond the Ou-Penman sample period (as 
Holthausen and Larcker (1992) show). 
The large number of metrics and justifications across studies makes it difficult to determine which 
approach is correct or robust. The selection of return predictors, proper mix for a trading signal, and success 
at publication hinges on the ability of the signal to predict returns. Like these other papers, we relate our 
signal to future returns, but the motivation for our hypothesis is uncomplicated and transparent: deviations 
from fair value are more likely to contract than expand. 
Finally, while many fund managers use fundamental analysis, we cannot infer whether fundamental 
analysis works by measuring the performance of professional money managers. Their alphas, which are on 
the order of 0-100 basis points per year before deducting transaction costs, fees, and other expenses, are 
small.14 More importantly, we do not know which managers use fundamental analysis to buy stocks their 
models claim are undervalued, and which employ strategies that are completely different. 
3. Data and methodology for fair value estimation 
We now assess whether fundamental analysis from accounting information, implemented with the 
rudimentary and mechanical approach of a statistician, contains information about future stock returns. On 
the last day of every month in the sample, we compute each stock’s degree of under- or overvaluation. We 
then track the returns of stocks over the subsequent month 15  and relate these returns to the stock’s 
                                                     
14 See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1992, 1993, 1994), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), 
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Wermers (2000), Fama and French (2010), Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), 
and Grinblatt, Jostova, Petrasek, and Philipov (2015). Larger performance is achieved when momentum-based 
returns are not penalized and with international fund management. Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2014) show that stocks 
heavily over-weighted (compared to the index weight) by actively managed funds greatly outperform those heavily 
under-weighted after adjustment for risk. 
15 To compute a return for the month starting at date t (also referred to as month t+1), we make standard adjustments 
to the reported Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) returns for delisting. See, for example, Shumway 
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beginning-of-month mispricing. 
3.1. Sample period and data filters 
There are 310 return months in our sample: March 1987 through December 2012, and thus 310 
portfolio formation dates, starting Saturday, February 28, 198716 and ending Friday, November 30, 2012. 
On the day of mispricing measurement and portfolio formation the stock must: 
1) Be in CRSP’s Monthly Stock File as the only common equity share class of a U.S. corporation 
(share classes 10 and 11), and be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (Amex), or Nasdaq Stock Market – National Market System (NASDQ-NMS) 
(exchange codes 1-3) with a share price of at least $5 and a positive number of common shares 
outstanding (to compute market capitalization). 
2) Have positive total assets and all accounting inputs required for the trading signal publically 
disclosed at the portfolio formation date. 
3) Possess a Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code that is not financial services (codes 60-69). 
3.2. Estimating peer-implied fair value and mispricing 
As noted earlier, firm j’s date t fair value is the prediction, Pj,t, from a cross-sectional regression of 
firms’ actual market values, Vj,t, on accounting variables known by market participants at date t. For each 
of the portfolio formation dates t, and each stock j, we calculate a mispricing signal, 
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ,  (1) 
                                                     
(1997), Amihud (2002), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). As delisting is rare, our results are not sensitive to the 
treatment of delisting. 
16 The first point date on the Compustat Point-in-Time database is 28 February 1987. An earlier version of the paper 
documented similar results using accounting data from the regular, quarterly Compustat going back to 1977. 
Bartram and Grinblatt (2014) use the same mispricing measure to study market efficiency in international equity 
markets. 
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as the percentage difference between the stock’s fair value prediction and its date t market capitalization. 
Underpriced stocks, those with large Mj,t, have low market values relative to the peer-implied values 
inferred from their most recent accounting statements. Such stocks are expected to outperform the 
overpriced stocks in the future. Conversely, stocks with highly negative Mj,t are overvalued stocks that are 
expected to underperform. By construction, the date t market capitalization-weighted average of Mj,t is 
zero.17 
To economically quantify the effect of mispricing, we rank each of the regression’s stocks at the 
end of each month based on the mispricing signal and sort firms into quintile portfolios: Q5 denotes the 
most underpriced quintile of stock and Q1 the most overpriced quintile. Coefficients from regressing returns 
on Q2-Q5 dummies can be interpreted as the added return from belonging to the respective mispricing 
quintile compared to the Q1 quintile. 
The regressors for the date t fair value predictions come from stock j’s (and other firms’) most 
recently reported 10Q or 10K income, balance sheet, or cash flow items, obtained from the CRSP-merged 
Compustat Point-in-Time database.18 This database captures data values known by the market from both 
preliminary announcements and final sources and combines originally reported and restated data in annual, 
quarterly, and year-to-date periodicities. On each of the monthly point dates, including the first, data on up 
to 20 prior fiscal quarters is available, reflecting the accounting information known to investors. 
We employ the 28 most common numerical firm-level19 accounting items reported by Compustat 
throughout the sample period listed as coming from the balance sheet (16 items), income statements (11 
items) and cash flow statements (1 item) available with 4 past fiscal quarters on February 28, 1987. 28 items 
                                                     
17 This property is isomorphic to the fair value regression’s average least squares residual being zero. 
18 As is customary when analyzing accounting data, all variables that inform trading positions are winsorized – here, 
based on their ratio to total assets at the top and bottom 5%, using the sample distribution that exists for that variable 
from all sample data released prior to and including month t. Our results are not sensitive to winsorization. 
19 Many of the 159 items in Compustat PIT, like firm name, ticker, and notes are not numerical. Many are titled “per 
share.” 
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is the largest number that achieves a 2,000-firm sample at the sample period’s start – desirable for statistical 
precision. 20  This coverage-imposed reduction of the accounting data matrix to 28 columns is fairly 
innocuous. Many of the uncommon items are redundant – often perfectly or almost perfectly spanned by 
linear combinations of the more common items. Thus, including additional accounting items adds little to 
the pertinent valuation information already contained within the most common 28. Indeed, 5 of the 28 
accounting items are perfectly spanned by the remaining 23, and for subsets of firms a few more are 
perfectly spanned by the remainder (suggesting that rounding conventions are inconsistent across items and 
firms). About 92% of the variation in half of the items is captured by the remaining half of the items. While 
such multicollinearity means the regression coefficients on many of the items are imprecise and sometimes 
indeterminate, the peer-implied fair value predictions from the 28 items are unique.21 
At the start of each trading month, we use the most recently reported 10K and the most recently 
reported 10Qs to identify values for these 28 items. The 16 balance sheet items are from the most recently 
released accounting statement (10K or 10Q); those from the income and cash flow statements are sums of 
the quarterly values from the three most recently released 10Qs and 10K. 22 Although summing four 
quarterly values may characterize the firm over portions of two fiscal years, it eliminates seasonal 
distortions that plague the quarterly items themselves. For expositional brevity, the “most recent accounting 
information” henceforth refers to the 16 items in the most recent balance sheet and the sum of the four 
quarterly values of the 12 items derived from the four most recent income and cash flow statements. 
Each firm’s peer-implied fair value evolves month to month for two reasons. First, market 
capitalizations, the cross-sectional regression’s dependent variable, change, influencing coefficients. For 
                                                     
20 Appendix B lists these 28 items along with details on variables used in the paper as return regression controls. 
21  Alternative mispricing signals that include the prior fiscal quarter of all 28 items capture growth rate. The 
performance of these signals is similar if not marginally stronger compared to signals without such lags. 
22 Note that cash flow items in Compustat PIT are cumulative. We infer the quarterly data item by taking the difference 
between the cumulative cash flow variables of adjacent fiscal quarters (for fiscal quarters other than the first). 
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example, rising stock prices imply a larger regression intercept even if accounting information or relative 
fair values do not change. Changes in relative market capitalizations across market sectors also change 
these coefficients. When firms with low earnings and large research and development (R&D) become 
relatively more valuable than the historical norm, as in the 1998-99 “internet bubble,” our cross-sectional 
approach will capture that change in market tastes. Second, firms may report new accounting information 
during the month. The new information changes the values and coefficients of the regressors used to predict 
fair value in the next month. 
In sum, our peer-based approach to fair value takes no stance on changing market preferences for 
certain types of stocks, or on whether the market as a whole is over- or undervalued at a given point in time. 
Nor does it rely on a formal theoretical model of fundamental value. Rather, we compare firms to one 
another. The comparison uses the statistical criterion of goodness of fit to discern how the market values 
accounting attributes at a given point in time. 
The OLS fair value regressions have R-squareds that vary month-to-month: the minimum R-
squared (unadjusted for degrees of freedom) is 76.6% (April 2000), the median is 92.7%, and the average 
is 91.7%. These R-squareds are unimpressive in light of the fact that market capitalization is on the left-
hand side and the right-hand side accounting entries tend to scale with firm size. All estimates of fair value 
and mispricing are highly inexact, including ours.23 The noise in our approach implies that our mispricing 
estimates will be larger than the profits from trading on these estimates and that these profits are likely to 
be enhanced by better mispricing estimation. Also, sampling error based on persistent variables will be 
persistent. Hence, we do not expect percentage mispricing estimates to converge to zero at the speed at 
which true mispricing converges to zero. 
                                                     
23 Numeric Investors, an institutional asset manager, estimates a fair value measure from a similar type of regression 
on a daily basis, based on cross-sectional regressions of stock prices on a proprietary set of company fundamentals, 
analysts’ forecasts etc. (see Perold and Tierney, 1997). 
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Due to the crude nature of our approach and the unknown statistical properties of the resulting 
mispricing signal, the empirical analysis focuses on a firm’s mispricing quintile. Outliers have two effects 
here: they distort the distribution of the mispricing variable, particularly in the tails, and they may distort 
the peer-implied regression coefficients. The first issue is addressed by focusing our analysis on quintile 
ranks (which are unaffected by most approaches that would shrink estimates of mispricing to improve them). 
Alternative estimators to ordinary least squares (OLS) can also mitigate the impact of outliers on the peer-
implied regression coefficients. We employ a variant of the estimator developed by Theil (1950) and Sen 
(1968) that is robust to outliers.24 Results for mispricing signals from TS estimation are generally stronger, 
both economically and statistically, compared to those using mispricing signals from OLS estimation. 
In simple estimation settings, the TS estimator is the median coefficient vector from all pairs of 
prediction vectors and outcomes of the dependent variable for sample subsets that offer a perfect fit. With 
large numbers of firms and estimated parameters, computational complexity requires estimation by random 
sampling. Moreover, we focus on the predictions of the regressions as opposed to the regression coefficients 
in order to avoid distortions in TS estimates induced by high degrees of multicollinearity. Each draw 
identifies 100 random firms in a month and fits the 28 accounting variables plus a constant to the market 
capitalizations of the firms in that month. For each month, we repeat the draw of 100 firms 100,000 times 
before identifying the median of the predicted market capitalizations for each firm as the TS estimate of its 
peer-implied value. 
3.3. Summary statistics for the overall sample 
Table 1 reports summary statistics describing the relationship of the (OLS) mispricing variable M 
to firm size, beta, book-to-market ratio, past returns over a variety of horizons, earnings surprises, accruals, 
                                                     
24 Ohlson and Kim (2015) argue that Theil-Sen estimation is superior to OLS estimation for linear valuation models 
because it is robust to outliers and does not require variable scaling to improve estimation efficiency. We are grateful 
to an anonymous referee for recommending this approach. 
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gross profitability, and earnings yield. It reports the time series average of the cross-sectional means of 
these variables in the first column, the time series average of the correlation of the variable with M in the 
second column, and the times series averages of the means of the variables within five mispricing quintiles. 
Quintile 1, in the Q1 column, represents the most overpriced stocks, which have average overpricing of 
203%; Quintile 5 (Q5) represents the most underpriced stocks, which have average underpricing of 538%.25 
As can be seen from Table 1, mispricing is highly related to a number of attributes known to predict 
returns. Compared to the 20% most overpriced firms, the 20% most underpriced firms are about nine times 
smaller, have a lower beta, lower past returns (at all three horizons), higher earnings-to-price and book-to-
market ratios. With respect to size, only about 13 firms among the 20% most underpriced reside in the top 
size quintile (using NYSE quintile breakpoints), on average. In short, overpriced stocks tend to be long-
term winning large growth stocks, with the opposite true for underpriced stocks, but there are lots of 
exceptions. 
M has positive correlations with book-to-market and earnings-to-price, and negative correlation 
with firm size and past returns. The negative correlation between beta and estimated mispricing indicates 
that beta risk could not explain any ability of M to forecast average returns (though it would be consistent 
with Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). Moreover, while M’s correlations are below 0.05 with other prominent 
anomalies in the finance literature, stocks in the most overpriced quintile have greater accruals and 
(positive) earnings surprises and lower gross profitability than the most underpriced stocks. For this reason, 
at various points in the paper, we control for the effect of book-to-market, earnings-to-price, size, past 
returns, gross profitability, accruals and earnings surprises on future average returns. The next section 
shows that M forecasts returns even after controlling for these effects. 
                                                     
25 These figures are large because extreme conditional means sort on sampling error and are therefore biased. However, 
since our later analysis only involves ranks, there is no need to adjust for the bias with statistical corrections like 
Bayesian shrinkage. 
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4. The mispricing attribute and the cross-section of expected returns 
4.1. Raw returns 
Table 2, similar in format to Table 1, addresses the mispricing signal’s ability to forecast next-
month’s return. As indicated in the column headings, the table focusses on mispricing signals based on OLS 
regressions, but also reports statistics in the last two columns for signals based on TS regressions. In 
particular, the table reports time series averages of both equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns, the 
average correlation between the return and mispricing signal, as well as the average return of portfolios 
formed from subgroups of stocks stratified by their mispricing signal. The time series averages are reported 
both overall and for two similar length sub-periods. In addition to the seven columns from Table 1, Table 
2 uses the null of efficient markets to test whether the mean return of the most underpriced quintile of stocks 
(Q5) exceeds that of the most overpriced quintile. The average difference and associated t-statistic (from 
the time series of paired differences) appear in the two rightmost columns under the OLS heading, flanked 
on their left by the fraction of return differences that are positive. For comparison, the last two columns 
under the heading TS report quintile spreads and associated t-statistics for signals from TS regressions. 
The average correlation between a firm’s signal, and its future returns is 0.0050. Moreover, average 
returns are also nearly perfectly monotonic in the mispricing quintiles, both for the full sample period and 
for sub-periods, using both value- and equal-weighted portfolios. The next-month return spread between 
the least and most underpriced stock quintiles is 0.42% (0.55% when value-weighted), an annualized return 
spread of 5.0% per year (6.6% per year for the spread in the value-weighted portfolios). Finally, the Q5-Q1 
spread is positive in about 58% of the months (55% when value-weighted). Across subperiods, return 
spreads are largest in the years 2000-2012. Using the Theil-Sen approach to measure peer-implied value 
mildly enhances the mispricing signal’s efficacy in several cases compared to OLS signals, yielding spreads 
between the most under- and overvalued stocks of 8.2% and 5.8% per year for equally-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios for the full sample period, 12.1 % and 9.5% in the last 12 years of the sample. 
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4.2. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions 
Table 2’s raw return differences could either be due to differences in expected returns associated 
with the mispricing signal per se or due to omitted variables linked to the cross-section of returns. To first 
analyze the issue, Table 3 cross-sectionally regresses firm j‘s month t+1 return on the firm’s mispricing 
signal and control variables known at the end of month t. It then averages the coefficients across all months. 
For a portfolio formed at the end of month t, the cross-sectional regression measures the mispricing signal’s 
efficacy from the coefficient bt in the regression 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 (2) 
where 
𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = stock j’s month t+1 return 
𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡    = end-of-month t value of firm j’s control characteristic s including industry fixed effects26 
 
Table 3’s time series averages of coefficients have Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics, which 
appear on their right in brackets. Because we do not know the correct functional form for the mispricing 
signal and want to calibrate its economic effect, the regressions use quintile dummies (Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5, 
with Q1 omitted due to the regression intercept) for all of the anomalies instead of the variables themselves. 
For brevity, the table displays coefficients and test statistics only for the Q5 dummy, which represents the 
difference in returns from being in Q5 compared to Q1; there are also unreported dummy coefficients for 
Q2, Q3 and Q4 for each of the characteristics included in the regression. 
Table 3 reports several specifications to assess the mispricing signal’s ability to predict returns. Its 
first specification lacks controls for other characteristics besides industry. The second and third add the 
                                                     
26 On every portfolio formation date, each firm is classified into one of the 38 industries using classifications from the 
Kenneth French data library, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The 
regression coefficients and test statistics without industry adjustment or when we force industry fixed effects 
coefficients to be one negligibly differ from those reported in Table 3. 
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more classic characteristics of betas, size, book-to-market, and past returns (over three non-overlapping 
horizons). The fourth and fifth add the four characteristics gross profitability, accruals, earnings yield, and 
earnings surprises. 27  These five specifications of Table 3 are based on OLS signals, while the sixth 
specification has the same control variables as specification five, but uses Theil-Sen signals. 
Specification 1 indicates that the average industry-adjusted return of mispricing quintile 5 exceeds 
that of quintile 1 by 46 basis points per month. M’s Q5-Q1 monthly spread increases to 54 basis points with 
traditional controls (Specification 3), which is five times the book-to-market effect in the same specification. 
In the kitchen sink regression (Specification 5), the characteristics controlled quintile spread for the 
mispricing signal is 36 basis points when it is based on OLS regressions. For the Theil-Sen signal, the effect 
is 44 basis points, about 4/5 the size of the same specification’s momentum effect (57 basis points). In all 
specifications, mispricing significantly predicts next month’s return. Mispricing’s smallest t-statistic of 2.82 
appears in the “kitchen sink” Specifications 5 and 6; it is more significant (t = 4.37) with the traditional 
controls of Specification 3. The coefficients are similar if we do not adjust for industry effects. 
Clearly, Specifications 5 and 6’s combination of book-to-market with other less traditional controls 
tied to earning captures some of the return predictability attributed to mispricing (and momentum). The 
results here indicate that the mispricing signal generates significant characteristic-adjusted profits that are 
about 2/3 of Specification 3’s profits, which lacks the earnings-related controls. The fact that the accounting 
variables and their weighting are chosen with no input from future returns suggests that less ad hoc 
approaches to fundamental analysis are likely to prove even more fruitful than what we have proposed.28
                                                     
27 To facilitate comparisons across specifications, month t’s regressions omit firms lacking data for all specifications. 
Results are highly similar without this restriction. 
28 Moreover, the dummy coefficients on mispricing signal Q5 average to a positive number in 9 (11) out of 12 calendar 
month for Specification 1 (3 and 5), and are positive in 60% of the 310-month sample period. The performance of 
the strategy is also not statistically different between firms that announce or do not announce earnings in a given 
month: Fama-MacBeth coefficients on the product of an earnings announcement month dummy and the mispricing 
signal are negligible when the specifications add this variable and an earnings announcement month dummy to the 
regression; coefficients on the mispricing signal remain of similar magnitude to those reported in Table 3. 
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The last 20 years of our sample period roughly correspond to the two decades in which the 
profitability of value and momentum strategies became widely known. Panel B of Table 3 averages Panel 
A’s coefficients for the sub-period of 1993-2012. In the four specifications that employ our mispricing 
signal, the effect of mispricing in the sub-period are about the same (TS) or stronger (OLS) than in the full 
sample period. By contrast, Panel B shows that in the last 20 years, there are modestly weaker momentum 
and earnings yield effects. 
4.3. Factor model time-series regressions 
As an alternative to cross-sectional regressions, we estimate factor model alphas of quintile 
portfolios of firms constructed from the mispricing signal. Compared to cross-sectional regressions, factor 
models study value-weighted portfolio returns with greater ease and indicate the degree to which long and 
short positions contribute to the alpha spreads of pairs of quintile portfolios. 
Denote 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡+1 to be the industry-adjusted month t+1 return on a quintile portfolio based on Mj,t. 
With L factors, we estimate its alpha as the intercept in the time series regression 
𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞,𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡+1 (3) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1 is the return difference (or excess return) of the lth factor portfolio. If fundamental analysis 
works, alphas should monotonically increase in the mispricing quintiles. Moreover, the difference in the 
alphas of the quintile 5 and 1 portfolios – a metric of the mispricing signal’s ability to earn abnormal profits 
– should be significantly positive. 
Table 4’s industry-adjusted returns are essentially a 0-factor specification. Panel A’s industry-
adjusted 48 basis points per month spread between mispricing quintiles 5 and 1 is not identical to the 46 
basis point spread in Table 3 Panel A. The spreads differ because Table 4 lifts the requirement that firms 
possess data for all of Table 3’s specifications. Table 4 also adjusts for industry effects by subtracting the 
industry return from the dependent variable, while Table 3 employs industry dummies as regressors. The 
industry-adjusted returns are monotonic. Annualized Sharpe ratios here, and throughout the paper, are 
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obtained by multiplying the t-statistics of the intercepts by 0.20, the square root of the ratio of 12 to the 
number of time series observations (typically, 310). For Panel A, the Sharpe ratios of the quintile 5-1 
spreads range from 0.63 (0-factor model) to 1.01 (6-factor model) for OLS-based signals, while TS signals 
have Sharpe ratios of up to 1.63. Our tables omit these ratios for brevity. 
Table 4’s 6- and 8-factor specifications nest the widely used Fama-French (1993) 3-factor, Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor, and Fama-French (2014) 5-factor models within them. The 6-factor model includes the 
market excess return (Mkt_RF), a size factor SMB (Small Minus Big), a value factor HML (High Minus 
Low), Momentum (Mom), a short-term reversal factor (ST_Rev), and a long-term reversal factor (LT_Rev). 
Table 4’s 8-factor model additionally employs an investment factor CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive) 
and profitability factor RMW (Robust Minus Weak) and represents the broadest factor model available in 
the Kenneth French data library.29 Appendix B provides more detail on all of the factors used in our analysis. 
The six factor betas in Table 4’s 6-factor model, all similar to their 8-factor counterparts, indicate 
that our mispricing strategy is exposed to five of the model’s six dimension of factor risk. Compared to 
overpriced firms, underpriced firms are more exposed to the returns of value firms with low betas and poor 
short- and medium-term (but better long-term) past returns. These findings are similar to those in Table 1 
when studying characteristics across the mispricing quintiles. 
Table 4’s alphas take out the return contribution of these factor exposures. The fairly monotonic 
alphas of the 6- and 8-factor models in the top and bottom halves of Panel A, respectively, are similar. The 
monotonicity strengthens the argument that fundamental analysis works. About 60 basis points per month 
distinguish the two extreme quintile portfolios’ OLS alphas, with almost all of the profitability of the alpha 
spreads coming from the most over-priced quintiles, which is consistent with short-selling constraints 
                                                     
29  See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The literature does not give 
unequivocal guidance on the factors that should be included in the risk model. The two additional return factors in 
the French data library are motivated by the research in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Jegadeesh (1990). The 
results are robust to adding a liquidity factor (from Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) and a misvaluation factor (from 
Hirshleifer and Jiang, 2010). 
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providing more investment opportunities on the short side.30 These spreads are also larger than the HML 
premium, even after controlling for HML. For signals from Theil-Sen regressions, all spreads are 
economically and statistically even more significant, ranging from 74 (0-factor model) to 87 basis points 
(6-factor model) per month. 
Panel B weights returns by market capitalization as of the end of month t, which is prior to the 
return month. At 47 and 39 basis points per month, these value-weighted OLS 6- and 8-factor alpha spreads 
are weaker than their equally weighted counterparts but are still significant. The same is true for Panel B’s 
TS estimates. Indeed, depending on the estimation technique and factor adjustment, value weighting tends 
to reduce alphas by 25-35%. This could indicate that large firms are more fairly priced than our mispricing 
estimate indicates, warranting firm size as an instrument for shrinking (or stretching) a firm’s mispricing 
estimate with commonly accepted statistical methods. However, lower spreads for value weighting could 
also be an artifact of poor diversification. Value-weighted portfolios containing large firms present special 
inference problems when they contain a few large firms.31 The existence of these firms makes portfolio 
alpha estimates imprecise and largely determined by the firm-specific return realizations of a few large 
firms rather than the portfolio’s true alpha. For example, with less than 1% of its stocks from the top NYSE 
size decile, it is impossible to accurately estimate the value-weighted mean return or alpha of the most 
underpriced quintile. Typically, only four of these mega-cap firms – often 100 times larger than the typical 
firm – appear in the most underpriced quintile.32 
                                                     
30 Consequently, the risk-adjusted quintile spreads could be weaker when excluding stocks that were on 'special' and 
hence difficult to borrow and sell short or when accounting for stock lending fess (Beneish, Lee, and Nichols, 2015). 
31 This issue is not present in a value-weighted index of all stocks, which achieves diversification by having many 
large firms. 
32 Size-based portfolio sorts using independent sorting procedures – even with equal weighting – do not overcome the 
inference problem. For example, in the top NYSE size quintile, the alpha of the 20% most underpriced stocks overall 
exceeds that of the 20% most overpriced by 101 basis points per month when benchmarked against the 8-factor 
model. Yet spreads of this magnitude, despite being rare, fail to attain the 5% significance threshold. The 
insignificance stands in contrast to the significant but smaller negative alpha of the far larger number of overpriced 
firms in the same size quintile.  
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In all cases, the alphas of the most underpriced quintile of stocks insignificantly differ from zero. 
Hence, like most efficient market anomalies in finance, the factor-adjusted profitability of spread portfolio 
strategies mostly come from the short leg of the strategy. Short sales constraints may hinder the ability to 
implement the spread strategy and short sales costs may reduce its profitability. However, there are other 
explanations, discussed at the end of the paper, for the absence of significantly positively alphas. 
5. Convergence to fair value better explains the results than alternatives 
Underpriced stocks have lower market betas and higher average returns than overpriced stocks. 
Moreover, other potential risk factors are unlikely to account for our trading strategy’s profitability. 
5.1. Alpha spreads already control for known sources of risk and firm size 
We regressed the times series of signal Q5 regression coefficients from Table 3 Panel A (which 
Fama and MacBeth noted are portfolio returns) on the factors in Table 4. The intercept (alpha) negligibly 
differs from the coefficients in Table 3 Panel A, and factor betas are mostly negligible. Thus, Table 3’s 
controls for other characteristics largely eliminate the factor risks that Table 4’s alphas already take into 
account.33 
We also ran regressions of each mispricing quintile’s industry adjusted return against the 
Stambaugh and Yu (2016) mispricing factor used in their 3-factor model. The betas against the mispricing 
factor of the extreme mispricing quintiles were mostly smaller at 0.181 (Q1) and 0.205 (Q5) than the betas 
of the three interior quintiles, which were 0.268 (Q2), 0.263 (Q3), and 0.194 (Q4), respectively. Moreover, 
the Q5-Q1 industry-adjusted return spread has a mispricing factor beta of only 0.024. By contrast, the spread 
portfolios represented by HML and Momentum have mispricing factor betas of 0.277 and 0.671, 
                                                     
33 Aretz, Bartram, and (2010) show that book-to-market, size, and momentum capture cross-sectional variation in 
exposures to a broad set of macroeconomic factors identified in the prior literature as potentially important for pricing 
equities. 
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respectively. Thus, an omitted mispricing factor does not account for any of our results. 
Berk (1995) noted that firms with lower market capitalizations (like our underpriced firms) tend to 
have higher discount rates for future dividend streams, other things equal. Irrespective of whether small 
firms’ higher discount rates are driven by omitted risk factors or animal spirits, we can assess the degree to 
which size differences across the mispricing quintiles play a role in our findings. If our mispricing signal 
“works” because it proxies for an omitted risk factor linked to market capitalization, 6- and 8-factor models 
(which contain size factors) should generate lower abnormal return spreads than spreads without factor 
controls. However, the 6- and 8-factor alpha spreads in industry adjusted returns, which control for known 
sources of factor risk, including size, exceed the (top row) spread in industry-adjusted returns. 
Finally, if an omitted risk variable tied to cross-sectional differences in size explains our alpha 
spreads, stale mispricing signals should produce almost the same alpha spreads as fresh signals. Cross-
sectional differences in book-to-market ratios take years to dissipate. Hence, return differences across firms 
based on book-to-market ratios are similar irrespective of whether book-to-market ratios are measured at 
the end of the prior month or prior year. By contrast, our accounting-based signal generates ranks that decay 
more rapidly. The average Spearman rank correlation between the vector of mispricing at month t and at t-
1 is 0.90, while the same correlation for the book-to-market ratio is 0.97. Moreover, the rank correlation 
between months t and t-12 is 0.55 for our mispricing measure, while it is 0.79 for the book-to-market ratio. 
Hence, if omitted risk accounted for our alpha spreads, that risk exposure would have to change rapidly, 
rather than be due to a more stable characteristic, like the cross-sectional difference in firm size. 
5.2. Signal delay 
Using (for fair comparisons) returns beginning in September 1990, Fig. 1 graphs the 6-factor (Panel 
A) and 8-factor (Panel B) alpha spreads for equally weighted portfolios of stocks in the extreme mispricing 
quintiles. These stocks are grouped into quintiles based on lags of the mispricing signal ranging from 0-35 
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months.34 The decay in the signal’s efficacy is rapid in the first month. For example, with the 6-factor alpha, 
the signal’s initial ability to earn abnormal returns of 73 basis points over the next month drops to 46 basis 
points when the mispricing signal is one month old. While strategy performance tends to decrease with 
more delay, the pattern is not monotonic, as signals lagged by 3 and 9 months still generate alphas of 57 
basis points per month. For signals between 2 and 12 months old, the signal generates 6-factor alphas of 47 
basis points per month on average; alphas average 20 basis points per month for signals that are 1 to 2 years 
old. The 8-factor alphas pattern is highly similar. 
Fig. 1 also shows the strategy’s performance when constructing a mispricing signal using 
accounting data that is lagged by 6 months relative to the point date (dashed lines). Because the point date 
is after the fiscal close date, this is more conservative than the assumed announcement six months after 
fiscal period end commonly imposed by researchers using the regular Compustat database. With our more 
conservative 6-months delay, alpha spreads shrink by 20-25bp, but are still significant. 
Fig. 2 shows the 6- and 8-factor alphas when updating market capitalization and accounting data, 
but using stale regression coefficients for weighting the accounting variables to derive fair value. Using 
weights that are one-year old reduces performance by about a quarter. While both the stale (and most recent) 
coefficients are estimated with error, averaging the weights over various windows does not enhance 
performance or prevent performance decay with a delayed signal. 
The signal delay results also help to estimate the profitability of a strategy that places signal-based 
trades and holds them for a full year. In a steady state, a strategy that puts on positions once, estimated more 
efficiently with overlapping one year returns, is like an equal-weighted combination of 12 strategies 
obtained from lags for the signal ranging from 0 to 11 months. The average alphas from such a “relaxed 
strategy,” as measured by averaging the first 12 alphas in Fig. 1 – namely, 49 and 44 basis points per month 
                                                     
34 Because of the later start date, the alphas for the 0 lag differ slightly from those in Table 4 Panel A. 
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for the 6- and 8-factor models, respectively – stem from trades with far lower turnover than a strategy that 
holds its signal-induced positions for only one month. With a signal that is refreshed every month, a long-
short mispricing strategy in the extreme quintiles has turnover of 262% per year, whereas holding positions 
for one year leads to annual turnover of 59%, with both turnover ratios almost equally split between the 
long and short positions. The relaxed strategy’s 5% monthly turnover thus requires unrealistically high 
trading costs of about 8% of each dollar traded before such costs offset the alpha spread. We also verified 
that the relaxed strategy’s alpha from a 1-year holding period is significant using Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
(1993, 2001) technique for estimation of the test statistics. 
6. What’s in the black box? 
To understand whether the signal’s “black box” proxies for an anomaly previously seen in the 
literature, Table 5 first investigates how the mispricing signal relates to a set of 22 documented anomalies. 
It reports the 6- (Panel A) and 8-factor (Panel B) alphas of trading strategies formed from the mispricing 
signal. The trades of these strategies take place within 110 subgroups of stocks that share similar amounts 
of an alternative characteristic known to predict returns and alphas.35 Each month, stocks are sorted first 
into quintiles based on one of 22 predictive characteristics. Within each quintile, they are then sorted into 
quintiles based only on our mispricing variable. The table’s alpha spreads are from a long-short trading 
strategy in the extreme mispricing quintiles produced by this sequential sort. If the 22 characteristics are 
highly related to our mispricing variable, the lack of mispricing signal variation in the sequential sort’s 
second step should eliminate significant alpha spreads from the mispricing signal. 
                                                     
35 These include the characteristics already considered in Table 3, i.e., beta, book/market, market capitalization, short-
term reversal, momentum, long-term reversal, accruals, earnings surprise, gross profitability, and earnings yield. 
Further predictors are scaled Net Operating Assets (NOA), share issuance, asset growth, capital investment, 
investment ratio, external financing, Z-Score, leverage, illiquidity, dividends/price, cash flow/price and value/price 
(Frankel and Lee, 1998). Sample size limitations make it undesirable to control for all characteristics simultaneously. 
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It is apparent from both panels that statistically and economically significant alpha spreads exist in 
almost all the quintiles of the other characteristics. Of the 110 6-factor alphas in Panel A, there are five 
scattered exceptions to significance, and only one of them (short-term reversal) exists in an extreme quintile 
of the characteristic. Of the 110 8-factor alphas in Panel B, there are eight scattered exceptions to 
significance, and only three of them (book/market, market capitalization, short-term reversal) are in an 
extreme quintile of the characteristic. Moreover, both panels’ alphas control for factors tied to size, book-
to-market, and past returns, and the 8-factor alphas control for profitability and investment. Thus, 
correlations between the 22 characteristics and the mispricing signal are unlikely drivers of the alpha from 
trading on the mispricing signal.36,37 
Direct analysis of the alpha-generating role played by each of the 28 accounting items in the black 
box is another way to expose drivers of the mispricing signal’s profitability. Unfortunately, there is no 
straightforward way to analyze the separate roles of each accounting item because they are highly collinear; 
a number of them are perfectly redundant in some or all months. 38 The marginal contribution of each 
variable to the remaining 27’s strategy profitability is necessarily trivial. Table 6 tries to circumvent this 
thorny issue. It shows industry- and risk-adjusted performance (using the 6- and 8-factor models) of long-
short trading strategies for modified mispricing signals derived from alternative specifications of the peer-
implied fair value regression. Its various specifications address how much each of the 28 accounting items 
                                                     
36 Table 5 also indicates that that the profitability of the mispricing strategy might be enhanced by focusing on groups 
of stocks with particular characteristics. These include stocks with small market capitalizations, low past returns 
(over short- and medium-term horizons), high earnings surprises, low scaled NOA, and low dividends/price. 
37 Mispricing estimates employing the staler market capitalizations at fiscal close (as opposed to those at the time of 
the mispricing signal) yield significant abnormal returns that are similar to those presented in the paper. This further 
rules out the issuance anomaly as a potential driver of our findings. See, e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Teoh and Wong (2002), Schultz (2003), Daniel 
and Titman (2006), Fama and French (2008), Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). 
38 For example, included in the 28 accounting items are Common/Ordinary Equity - Total, Preferred/Preference Stock 
(Capital) - Total, and Stockholders Equity – Total, with the latter being the sum of the first two. Due to the collinearity 
of the regressions, the estimated coefficients can flip signs from month to month. To illustrate, the average coefficient 
of net income is 7.2, with a minimum of -219.9 and a maximum of 114.5. Nevertheless, this is not a concern since 
only the predicted value is necessary to construct the mispricing signal. 
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contributed to overall performance by adding (Panel A) or subtracting (Panel B) the accounting items in a 
particular sequence, determined by coverage. Panel C looks at performance using only the 16 balance sheet 
items or only the 12 income statement and cash flow statement items to determine fair value. 
Each of Panel A’s 29 fair value regression specifications uses the accounting item listed in its row 
plus all of the accounting items in the rows above as regressors. Each of Panel B’s 29 specifications use all 
accounting items excluding the accounting items in the rows above.39 Thus, Panel A’s starting point (the 
first row) is the signal from monthly cross-sectional fair value regressions without any accounting variables. 
As we subsequently add each of the 28 items one by one, performance from the resulting signal tends to 
increase, though not entirely monotonically, and sometimes in smaller and sometimes in larger increments. 
Performance turns statistically significant with the addition of the balance sheet item Assets - Other - Total 
(row 11) and noticeably increases with the inclusion of Sales/Turnover (Net) (row 19) and Income Before 
Extraordinary Item (row 21). The latter inclusion nearly doubles performance. Adding the only cash flow 
variable (Cash Dividends (Cash Flow)) to the signal actually detracts from performance. The bottom of 
Panel A, as well as the top of Panel B, considers all 28 items from the balance sheet, income and cash flow 
statements and was reported earlier in Table 4. This analysis shows that our approach requires more than 
one accounting item in order to generate significant trading profits. 
In Panel B, performance declines as we drop items. The two largest declines in the 6- and 8-factor 
alphas occur when Pretax Income is dropped from the specification (which still includes all of the 
accounting items below it as regressors) and when Sales/Turnover (Net) is dropped from the fair value 
regression. The ten remaining items below, which have the least coverage among the 28, cannot produce 
significant trading profits without assistance from some of the items listed above them. 
                                                     
39 For fair comparisons, we require firms to have non-missing data on all 28 accounting items even if we do not use 
all 28 items in all but one of the alternative fair value regressions. 
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Note that signals from fair-value regressions without any accounting variables (the top row of Panel 
A or the bottom row of Panel B) are effectively “pseudo” signals that capture relative market capitalization. 
Controlling for SMB and other standard risk factors, we no longer find risk-adjusted returns from this 
pseudo signal. By contrast, controlling for these risk factors, including SMB, has little effect on the return 
spreads of the signal with all 28 accounting variables. Consequently, the mispricing signal is unlikely to 
capture omitted risk factors tied to market capitalization. This finding buttresses our earlier argument that 
Berk’s (1995) critique does not apply here. 
Panel C’s two specifications separately analyze the efficacy of the balance sheet and income/cash 
flow items separately. Using the 16 balance sheet items generates about as much performance as the income 
statement and cash flow items. In sum, Table 6 shows that there are more parsimonious ways of estimating 
mispricing, but the precise specification of that parsimony will be hard to flesh out. Moreover, any more 
parsimonious approach to identifying fair value cannot consist of just a handful of items, nor can it consist 
of items solely from the income statement, balance sheet, or cash flow statement. 40 
We also implement a mechanical stepwise procedure that adds and deletes regressors - one at a 
time - from the valuation regression model for that month. Using a 15% significance level, the procedure 
settles on a specification where each regressor in the model is individually significant and each potential 
regressor omitted is insignificant when added to the model. Averaged across sample months, the procedure 
selects about 21 of the 28 variables (minimum 15, maximum 27). The risk-adjusted performance is, 
however, similar to that from the signal that use the same 28 variables in each month’s valuation regression. 
                                                     
40 To further illustrate this point, a more discretionary signal that uses only three accounting items - book equity, net 
income, and sales - generates mostly statistically insignificant alphas that are about 50% smaller compared to those 
of our more agnostic signal derived from 28 accounting items. 
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7. Conclusion 
Regression-based fitting of the latest available accounting data to stock values leads to a mispricing 
measure constructed from regression residuals. This hedonic approach to fundamental analysis is essentially 
saying that firms should be valued as a collection of accounting attributes from their most recent accounting 
statements. With our approach, future returns play no role for the weighting of the accounting items, yet 
ranking firms based on their residual-implied percentage mispricing predicts returns in the subsequent 
month and up to three years in the future. The results are not related to the most commonly known predictors 
of the cross-section of expected returns. Abnormal return spreads based on mispricing metrics formed from 
accounting data range from 4-10% per year. Thus, market prices do not fully reflect accounting data: 
rudimentary statistical analysis of the most commonly reported accounting information leads to risk-
adjusted returns of a magnitude comparable to those earned by value and momentum strategies. 
Our industry-adjusted returns and alphas tend to be negative across mispricing quintiles and are not 
significantly positive for the underpriced firms. This is due to the industry adjustment as the equal-weighted 
industry portfolios have much more weight on low priced stocks than either the mispricing portfolios or the 
benchmark factor portfolios.41 
One could, of course, investigate other potentially valuable information with the type of statistical 
analysis undertaken here. The other information could include changes in the same item in more than one 
consecutive accounting statement, analyst forecasts, or corporate actions. One could even combine the 
current accounting information with the information in past price movements. An investigation of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Our task here was to apply minimal discretion in estimating a peer-
                                                     
41 With no cutoffs for share price, the low-priced stocks in the French data library’s equally weighted industry sample 
load more negatively on the momentum and RMW earnings factors (boosting equally weighted industry portfolio 
alphas significantly, perhaps artificially). Unlike most anomaly studies, our raw sample does not have this alpha 
issue because of its five dollar share price filter. With a customized industry portfolio adjustment restricted to our 
sample selection or with no industry adjustment at all, there is no tendency towards negative alphas across quintiles. 
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implied intrinsic value to examine if a reasonably agnostic form of fundamental analysis works. It seems 
to work very well, indeed. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of our results is the claim that the profits obtained are from 
fundamental analysis. By using the term “fundamental analysis,” we are ultimately telling a behavioral 
story about mispricing and convergence to fair value. We have, however, presented evidence supporting 
the claim that the abnormal profits earned from our version of fundamental analysis are not due to an 
omitted risk factor.42 We focus only on returns, adjusted for risk factors, rather than more direct measures 
of convergence, because measuring convergence from returns is a more conservative approach. Our 
estimate of fair value exhibits regression towards the mean over time, like most other estimates. Hence, 
direct measure of the dynamics of the distance between fair value and prices leads to stronger convergence 
estimates than examining returns alone. Holding fair values constant, underpriced stocks that witness price 
increases and overpriced stocks that witness price decreases converge to the old fair value. Holding share 
prices fixed, fair value estimates that greatly exceed prices tend to decline while those well below the same 
price tend to increase. Hence, the simple regression to the mean phenomenon implies that direct 
measurement of convergence is a less conservative approach for making the point that fundamental analysis 
works, and it has continued to work for 25 years. 
Because we focus indiscriminately on the most widely available accounting items, and because of 
their high degree of collinearity, it is difficult to successfully identify which accounting variables are best 
for determining fair value. Addressing this question more precisely with a try-all-specifications approach 
is blatant data snooping. Because the accounting data seem to have an underlying factor structure, many 
fewer accounting variables could do as well, or improve upon, the strategies derived here. We leave that, 
as well as improvements in the fair value estimation approach, to future research. 
                                                     
42 In unreported results, we also find that the mispricing signal predicts the repurchasing and issuing of shares by 
companies over the subsequent 3-12 months. 
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Our paper is not another anomaly paper because our approach differs from the approaches taken 
by the papers in the anomalies literature. The selection of accounting items is intended to be universal, 
except that coverage and statistical power require limitations on the number of accounting items. So, as a 
practical compromise, our model employs the most common reported accounting items across firms. It is 
the absence of discretion here that distinguishes our paper from predecessors that study market efficiency 
and represents its unique contribution to that literature.  
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Figure 1: Signal Decay 
The figure shows portfolio alphas from 36 pairs of 6- and 8-factor model time-series regressions. Signals 
are constructed using alternatively point-in-time dates (solid line) or point-in-time dates plus 6 months 
(dashed line) for the timing of the availability of accounting data. Each month, stocks are sorted into 
quintiles (Q1-Q5) based on a lagged mispricing signal (M), lags from 0 to 35 months, and combined into 
equally-weighted portfolios. Each spread portfolio return (in excess of the industry portfolios based on the 
38 Fama French industry classifications) from one of the 36 signals, the difference between the returns of 
portfolios Q5 and Q1, is regressed on a set of factors: For the 6-factor model, the factors are Mkt_RF, SMB, 
HML, Mom, ST_Rev and LT_Rev, obtained from the Kenneth French data library; the 8-factor model 
additionally includes the CMA and RMW factors from Kenneth French data library. The sample consists 
of all ordinary common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, 
Nasdaq) with a share price at the beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample 
period is 9/1990-12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Figure 2: Accounting Weights 
The figure shows alphas from 12 pairs of factor model time-series regressions. Stocks are sorted each month 
into quintiles (Q1-Q5) based on a mispricing signal (M) and combined into equally-weighted portfolios. 
The mispricing signal is based on fair value estimates, derived from cross-sectional regressions, that weight 
accounting variables. The fair value prediction that determines the 5 quintile portfolios uses coefficients 
that are from fair value regressions lagged between 0 and 11 months along with the accounting variables 
from lag 0. Each spread portfolio return (in excess of the industry portfolios based on the 38 Fama French 
industry classifications) from one of the 12 signals, the difference between the returns of portfolios Q5 and 
Q1, is regressed on a set of factors: For the 6-factor model, the factors are Mkt_RF, SMB, HML, Mom, 
ST_Rev and LT_Rev, obtained from the Kenneth French data library; the 8-factor model additionally 
includes the CMA and RMW factors from Kenneth French data library. The sample consists of all ordinary 
common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) with a 
share price at the beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 3/1988-
12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Mispricing Signal Quintiles 
The table reports averages of a number of characteristics of portfolios and firms, including the time-series average of the mean characteristics across 
all firms (“All”), the average cross-sectional correlation of the characteristic with the mispricing signal M (“Correlation”), as well as the average of 
the mean characteristics across quintiles of firms sorted by the mispricing signal M from Q1 (most overpriced) to Q5 (most underpriced). The sample 
consists of all ordinary common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) with a share price at the 
beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 3/1987-12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
All Correlation Q1 (Overvalued) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (Undervalued)
Mispricing Signal (M ) 0.9640 1.000 -2.0253 -0.2427 0.3996 1.3042 5.3848
Market Capitalization 2,847.7 -0.068 3,541.8 5,941.9 3,006.4 1,365.7 381.3
Book/Market 0.5774 0.291 0.4071 0.4198 0.5054 0.6361 0.9186
Beta 0.9280 -0.139 1.0259 1.0018 0.9764 0.9102 0.7227
Accruals 0.9507 -0.010 1.8169 0.8555 0.6942 0.6995 0.7328
SUE 0.0140 0.026 0.0275 0.0021 0.0093 0.0230 0.0082
Gross Profitability 0.3685 0.042 0.3011 0.3811 0.3907 0.3875 0.3819
Earnings Yield 0.0210 0.159 -0.0537 0.0271 0.0387 0.0439 0.0488
Prior Month Return t 2.0692 -0.029 3.5124 2.7653 1.9508 1.3282 0.7908
Return from Month t -1 to t -11 23.41 -0.068 38.741 32.365 21.825 14.64 9.670
Return from Month t -12 to t -59 99.43 -0.048 109.19 114.73 107.47 92.44 73.45
Signal Quintiles
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Table 2: Stock Returns and Mispricing Signal Quintiles 
The table reports averages and selected test statistics of monthly portfolio returns, including the time-series average of the mean return across all 
firms (“All”), the average cross-sectional correlation between returns and the mispricing signal M (“Correlation”), as well as the average return 
across quintiles of firms sorted by the mispricing signal M from Q1 (most overpriced) to Q5 (most underpriced). The table also shows the time-
series average of the spread between the returns of the most undervalued (Q5) and the most overvalued (Q1) firms, as well as the associated t-
statistics. Moreover, the table reports the fraction of time-series observations of the quintile spread that is greater than zero and the p-value of a 
binomial test against 50%. Columns under the OLS heading report results for signals from OLS regressions, while columns under the TS heading 
show results for signals from Theil-Sen regressions as described in the text. Panels A and B report results for equal- and value-weighted portfolios, 
respectively. The sample consists of all ordinary common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) 
with a share price at the beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 3/1987-12/2012. 
 
 
All Correlation Q1 (Overvalued) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (Undervalued) Fraction > 0 p-value Average t-stat Average t-stat
Panel A: Equally-weighted Portfolios
Return in Month t+1 0.9224 0.0050 0.6309 0.9166 0.9713 1.0420 1.0502 58.1 [0.00] 0.4192 [2.38] 0.6790 [4.03]
Return in Month t+1 (1987-1999) 1.0575 0.0071 0.7122 1.1522 1.1609 1.1850 1.0763 58.4 [0.04] 0.3641 [1.56] 0.5622 [2.41]
Return in Month t+1 (2000-2012) 0.7889 0.0030 0.5507 0.6840 0.7841 0.9009 1.0244 57.7 [0.05] 0.4737 [1.79] 0.7943 [3.26]
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolios
Return in Month t+1 0.8669 0.0091 0.4753 0.8964 0.8971 1.0519 1.0217 54.5 [0.11] 0.5465 [2.53] 0.4850 [1.67]
Return in Month t+1 (1987-1999) 1.4113 0.0013 1.0979 1.4080 1.4248 1.3505 1.2417 52.6 [0.52] 0.1437 [0.57] -0.0474 [-0.13]
Return in Month t+1 (2000-2012) 0.3294 0.0168 -0.1394 0.3914 0.3763 0.7571 0.8046 56.4 [0.11] 0.9440 [2.72] 1.0106 [2.24]
Signal Quintiles Q5-Q1 (Undervalued - Overvalued)
OLS TS
Q5-Q1
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Table 3: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions 
The table shows average coefficients and test statistics from Fama MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly returns on stock characteristics. Across 
different specifications, returns are regressed against end-of-prior-month values for the mispricing signal M, market beta, book-to-market, market 
capitalization, short-term reversal, momentum, long-term reversal, accruals, SUE, gross profitability, and earnings yield. Columns under the OLS 
heading report results for signals from OLS regressions, while columns under the TS heading show results for signals from Theil-Sen regressions as 
described in the text. The table employs quintile dummies for the characteristics as regressors. Each month’s quintiles are determined from sorts of 
firms with non-missing values for all characteristics. Size quintiles are based on NYSE breakpoints. The regressions include dummy variables for 
quintiles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of each characteristic, but only display the coefficients of the quintile dummy with the largest amount of the characteristic 
(Q5) for brevity. Panel A shows results for the full sample period, while Panel B shows results for the 1993-2012 sub-period. All regressions include 
industry dummy variables based on the 38 Fama French industry classifications. The table also shows the average number of observations and 
average adjusted R-Squared. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The sample 
consists of all ordinary common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) with a share price at the 
beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 3/1987-12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A: Regressions with Quintile Dummies 
 
(continued) 
  
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Mispricing Signal (M ) Q5 0.4614 [2.79] *** 0.5376 [4.37] *** 0.3621 [2.82] *** 0.4353 [3.67] ***
Beta Q5 -0.1028 [-0.47] -0.1274 [-0.60] -0.0407 [-0.19] -0.0593 [-0.30] -0.0073 [-0.04]
Market Capitalization Q5 -0.0248 [-0.12] -0.0374 [-0.18] -0.0111 [-0.06] -0.1257 [-0.62] -0.0173 [-0.08]
Book/Market Q5 0.3022 [1.78] * 0.1040 [0.62] 0.4823 [2.77] *** 0.2429 [1.45] 0.1818 [1.06]
Short-term Reversal Q5 -1.1099 [-6.24] *** -1.0818 [-6.14] *** -1.1754 [-6.68] *** -1.1663 [-6.79] *** -1.1656 [-6.74] ***
Momentum Q5 0.7910 [3.75] *** 0.8079 [3.81] *** 0.5891 [2.85] *** 0.5627 [2.76] *** 0.5746 [2.82] ***
Long-term Reversal Q5 -0.2791 [-2.46] ** -0.3082 [-2.75] *** -0.1119 [-1.03] -0.2063 [-1.94] * -0.2274 [-2.14] **
Accruals Q5 -0.5948 [-7.01] *** -0.6498 [-7.53] *** -0.6400 [-7.36] ***
SUE Q5 0.4740 [4.85] *** 0.4043 [4.25] *** 0.4138 [4.35] ***
Gross Profitability Q5 0.6763 [5.74] *** 0.5457 [4.94] *** 0.5265 [4.76] ***
Earnings Yield Q5 0.3732 [3.22] *** 0.3220 [2.79] ***
Intercept 0.2945 [0.77] 0.7835 [1.60] 0.6402 [1.27] 0.4612 [0.87] 0.5208 [0.97] 0.4131 [0.77]
Observations 1,349 1,349 1,349 1,349 1,349 1,349
Adj. RSquare 0.041 0.073 0.074 0.077 0.080 0.079
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS TS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 3: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regressions with Quintile Dummies for 1993-2012 
 
 
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Mispricing Signal (M ) Q5 0.5650 [2.94] *** 0.5755 [4.10] *** 0.4784 [3.32] *** 0.4551 [3.35] ***
Beta Q5 -0.1313 [-0.50] -0.1657 [-0.65] -0.0684 [-0.27] -0.0896 [-0.38] -0.0441 [-0.18]
Market Capitalization Q5 -0.0906 [-0.37] -0.1618 [-0.65] -0.0823 [-0.35] -0.2207 [-0.93] -0.0942 [-0.39]
Book/Market Q5 0.3941 [1.96] * 0.1830 [0.92] 0.5788 [2.81] *** 0.3179 [1.62] 0.2754 [1.37]
Short-term Reversal Q5 -1.0877 [-5.01] *** -1.0524 [-4.89] *** -1.1537 [-5.38] *** -1.1334 [-5.42] *** -1.1365 [-5.38] ***
Momentum Q5 0.6287 [2.39] ** 0.6529 [2.47] ** 0.4813 [1.88] * 0.4714 [1.86] * 0.4826 [1.90] *
Long-term Reversal Q5 -0.3022 [-2.26] ** -0.3281 [-2.50] ** -0.1367 [-1.07] -0.2075 [-1.67] * -0.2356 [-1.89] *
Accruals Q5 -0.5263 [-5.42] *** -0.5589 [-5.65] *** -0.5485 [-5.48] ***
SUE Q5 0.3673 [3.12] *** 0.3072 [2.69] *** 0.3130 [2.75] ***
Gross Profitability Q5 0.6678 [4.67] *** 0.5513 [4.18] *** 0.5380 [4.06] ***
Earnings Yield Q5 0.2818 [2.08] ** 0.2576 [1.94] *
Intercept 0.1265 [0.29] 0.7091 [1.20] 0.5982 [0.98] 0.4274 [0.67] 0.4758 [0.73] 0.3683 [0.57]
Observations 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
Adj. RSquare 0.045 0.079 0.080 0.083 0.086 0.085
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS TS
(5) (6)(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 4: Factor Model Time-Series Regressions 
The table shows average industry-adjusted portfolio returns (measured by portfolio weighting each stock return in excess of its industry portfolio 
return based on the 38 Fama-French industry classifications), as well as intercepts, slope coefficients, and test-statistics from time-series regressions 
of monthly industry-adjusted portfolio returns on 6 or 8 factors. Stocks are sorted each month into quintiles based on the mispricing signal (M) and 
combined into equally-weighted (Panel A) or value-weighted (Panel B) portfolios. The table reports averages and regression statistics separately for 
each of the five portfolios, Q1-Q5, and for the corresponding times series of return spreads between the most undervalued (Q5) and overvalued (Q1) 
stock quintiles. Regressors are Mkt_RF, SMB, HML, Mom, ST_Rev, LT_Rev, RMW and CMA, obtained from the data library of Kenneth French. 
Columns under the OLS heading report results for signals from OLS regressions, while columns under the TS heading show results for signals from 
Theil-Sen regressions as described in the text. The table also shows the average number of observations and adjusted R-Squared. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The sample consists of all ordinary common stocks of U.S. 
nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) with a share price at the beginning of the return month of not less than five 
dollars. The sample period is 3/1987-12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
(continued) 
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Table 4: Factor Model Time-Series Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted Portfolios 
 
 
(continued) 
  
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Industry-Adjusted Return -0.4482 [-3.36] *** -0.1884 [-1.30] -0.0852 [-0.62] 0.0091 [0.08] 0.0332 [0.30] 0.4814 [3.19] *** 0.7400 [4.97] ***
Alpha -0.5978 [-5.34] *** -0.2976 [-2.48] ** -0.1980 [-1.62] -0.0764 [-0.68] 0.0253 [0.26] 0.6232 [5.11] *** 0.8709 [8.31] ***
Mkt_RF 0.0805 [2.95] *** 0.0838 [2.86] *** 0.0792 [2.66] *** 0.0635 [2.32] ** -0.0290 [-1.22] -0.1095 [-3.68] *** -0.1784 [-6.98] ***
SMB -0.0708 [-1.72] * -0.1660 [-3.75] *** -0.1632 [-3.62] *** -0.0873 [-2.11] ** -0.1126 [-3.13] *** -0.0418 [-0.93] -0.1183 [-3.07] ***
HML -0.0042 [-0.10] -0.0026 [-0.06] 0.1368 [2.99] *** 0.2215 [5.28] *** 0.2644 [7.24] *** 0.2685 [5.89] *** 0.3241 [8.27] ***
Mom 0.2681 [11.17] *** 0.2688 [10.43] *** 0.2069 [7.88] *** 0.1004 [4.17] *** 0.0393 [1.87] * -0.2288 [-8.75] *** -0.2136 [-9.50] ***
ST_Rev -0.0895 [-2.78] *** -0.1277 [-3.70] *** -0.0432 [-1.23] -0.0164 [-0.51] -0.0256 [-0.91] 0.0639 [1.82] * 0.0834 [2.77] ***
LT_Rev -0.0328 [-0.62] -0.0985 [-1.74] * -0.1670 [-2.89] *** -0.1654 [-3.13] *** -0.1679 [-3.64] *** -0.1350 [-2.35] ** -0.0357 [-0.72]
RSquare 0.35 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.30 0.40 0.54
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Alpha -0.6840 [-6.04] *** -0.4002 [-3.31] *** -0.3469 [-2.95] *** -0.2246 [-2.08] ** -0.0707 [-0.71] 0.6133 [4.83] *** 0.8039 [7.43] ***
Mkt_RF 0.0998 [3.49] *** 0.1072 [3.51] *** 0.1120 [3.77] *** 0.0987 [3.62] *** -0.0028 [-0.11] -0.1026 [-3.20] *** -0.1593 [-5.84] ***
SMB -0.0204 [-0.48] -0.1069 [-2.38] ** -0.0746 [-1.71] * -0.0049 [-0.12] -0.0667 [-1.81] * -0.0464 [-0.98] -0.0880 [-2.19] **
HML -0.0716 [-1.31] -0.0843 [-1.45] 0.0223 [0.39] 0.0989 [1.90] * 0.1739 [3.65] *** 0.2455 [4.02] *** 0.2585 [4.97] ***
Mom 0.2517 [10.53] *** 0.2494 [9.77] *** 0.1784 [7.19] *** 0.0727 [3.19] *** 0.0223 [1.07] -0.2294 [-8.56] *** -0.2252 [-9.87] ***
ST_Rev -0.1022 [-3.23] *** -0.1422 [-4.21] *** -0.0662 [-2.01] ** -0.0351 [-1.16] -0.0324 [-1.17] 0.0699 [1.97] ** 0.0799 [2.64] ***
LT_Rev 0.0260 [0.47] -0.0315 [-0.53] -0.0604 [-1.05] -0.0790 [-1.49] -0.1376 [-2.83] *** -0.1636 [-2.63] *** -0.0202 [-0.38]
CMA -0.0172 [-0.22] -0.0124 [-0.15] -0.0423 [-0.52] 0.0090 [0.12] 0.0720 [1.04] 0.0891 [1.01] 0.0648 [0.86]
RMW 0.2291 [4.18] *** 0.2681 [4.58] *** 0.4037 [7.10] *** 0.3712 [7.10] *** 0.2009 [4.19] *** -0.0282 [-0.46] 0.1314 [2.51] **
RSquare 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.55
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Q5-Q1 
(Undervalued - 
Overvalued)
OLS TS
Q5-Q1 
(Undervalued - 
Overvalued)Q1 (Overvalued) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (Undervalued)
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Table 4: Factor Model Time-Series Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolios 
 
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Industry-Adjusted Return -0.4878 [-2.48] ** -0.2453 [-1.07] -0.1999 [-0.95] -0.0025 [-0.02] 0.0277 [0.19] 0.5155 [2.73] *** 0.5966 [2.40] **
Alpha -0.4594 [-3.09] *** -0.2573 [-1.79] * -0.2125 [-1.50] -0.0448 [-0.34] 0.0066 [0.05] 0.4660 [2.87] *** 0.6417 [3.96] ***
Mkt_RF 0.1031 [2.85] *** 0.0351 [1.00] 0.0389 [1.12] 0.0983 [3.03] *** 0.1000 [3.21] *** -0.0031 [-0.08] -0.2128 [-5.39] ***
SMB -0.6386 [-11.68] *** -0.8843 [-16.72] *** -0.7925 [-15.14] *** -0.4358 [-8.89] *** -0.3154 [-6.70] *** 0.3232 [5.40] *** 0.1029 [1.72] *
HML -0.1230 [-2.22] ** 0.1233 [2.30] ** 0.1462 [2.75] *** 0.1649 [3.31] *** 0.2007 [4.20] *** 0.3237 [5.33] *** 0.6810 [11.25] ***
Mom 0.2016 [6.33] *** 0.2450 [7.95] *** 0.1873 [6.15] *** 0.0911 [3.19] *** -0.0051 [-0.19] -0.2067 [-5.93] *** -0.3798 [-10.93] ***
ST_Rev -0.1567 [-3.67] *** -0.1785 [-4.32] *** -0.0261 [-0.64] -0.0361 [-0.94] -0.0193 [-0.52] 0.1374 [2.94] *** 0.3034 [6.51] ***
LT_Rev -0.0968 [-1.38] -0.0072 [-0.11] -0.1087 [-1.62] -0.1092 [-1.74] * -0.1052 [-1.75] * -0.0084 [-0.11] 0.0006 [0.01]
RSquare 0.47 0.64 0.58 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.61
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Alpha -0.5241 [-3.40] *** -0.4394 [-3.19] *** -0.3746 [-2.81] *** -0.2133 [-1.67] * -0.1334 [-1.06] 0.3907 [2.34] ** 0.3070 [2.04] **
Mkt_RF 0.1208 [3.11] *** 0.0763 [2.19] ** 0.0688 [2.05] ** 0.1368 [4.23] *** 0.1322 [4.16] *** 0.0114 [0.27] -0.1150 [-3.02] ***
SMB -0.6079 [-10.63] *** -0.7787 [-15.23] *** -0.6835 [-13.84] *** -0.3387 [-7.13] *** -0.2352 [-5.04] *** 0.3727 [6.01] *** 0.2485 [4.44] ***
HML -0.1843 [-2.49] ** -0.0208 [-0.31] 0.0403 [0.63] 0.0307 [0.50] 0.0885 [1.46] 0.2728 [3.39] *** 0.3442 [4.75] ***
Mom 0.1902 [5.85] *** 0.2105 [7.24] *** 0.1546 [5.51] *** 0.0592 [2.19] ** -0.0315 [-1.19] -0.2217 [-6.29] *** -0.4369 [-13.74] ***
ST_Rev -0.1611 [-3.75] *** -0.2046 [-5.32] *** -0.0602 [-1.62] -0.0599 [-1.67] * -0.0387 [-1.10] 0.1224 [2.62] *** 0.2902 [6.89] ***
LT_Rev -0.0770 [-1.02] 0.1138 [1.68] * 0.0506 [0.78] 0.0009 [0.01] -0.0154 [-0.25] 0.0616 [0.75] 0.0571 [0.77]
CMA 0.0501 [0.47] -0.0275 [-0.29] -0.1576 [-1.70] * -0.0206 [-0.23] -0.0128 [-0.15] -0.0629 [-0.54] 0.3775 [3.59] ***
RMW 0.1344 [1.80] * 0.4791 [7.19] *** 0.5060 [7.86] *** 0.4405 [7.11] *** 0.3634 [5.97] *** 0.2290 [2.83] *** 0.6248 [8.57] ***
RSquare 0.48 0.69 0.66 0.44 0.35 0.33 0.69
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
OLS TS
Q5-Q1 
(Undervalued - 
Overvalued)
Q5-Q1 
(Undervalued - 
Overvalued)Q1 (Overvalued) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (Undervalued)
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Table 5: Mispricing Strategies and Other Anomalies 
The table shows intercepts and t-statistics from time-series regressions of monthly industry-adjusted 
portfolio returns of a mispricing-based spread portfolio on 6 (Panel A) or 8 (Panel B) factors. Stocks are 
first sorted each month into quintiles, designated by column heading, based on the row’s firm characteristic. 
Within each of the former quintiles, stocks are further sorted into quintiles based on the mispricing signal 
and combined into equally-weighted portfolios. The industry-adjusted return difference of the most 
underpriced and overpriced stocks within each cell are then regressed on Mkt_RF, SMB, HML, Mom, 
ST_Rev, LT_Rev, RMW and CMA, obtained from the data library of Kenneth French. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The sample consists of all 
ordinary common stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) 
with a share price at the beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 
3/1987-12/2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: 6-Factor Alphas 
  
(continued) 
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Beta 0.7066 [4.56] *** 0.3736 [2.58] ** 0.5126 [3.56] *** 0.4138 [2.40] ** 0.7525 [4.04] ***
Book/Market 0.4123 [1.95] * 0.2349 [1.46] 0.4028 [2.57] ** 0.4948 [3.11] *** 0.4846 [2.89] ***
Market Capitalization 0.8621 [5.30] *** 0.7783 [4.80] *** 0.7415 [4.80] *** 0.5527 [3.80] *** 0.2656 [1.96] *
Short-term Reversal 1.1474 [5.65] *** 0.7717 [5.07] *** 0.5141 [3.21] *** 0.0916 [0.61] 0.1723 [0.92]
Momentum 1.1044 [5.82] *** 0.6540 [3.99] *** 0.4950 [3.37] *** 0.5871 [3.82] *** 0.7501 [3.83] ***
Long-term Reversal 0.6473 [3.38] *** 0.7433 [4.62] *** 0.5243 [3.44] *** 0.4824 [3.03] *** 0.8142 [4.04] ***
Accruals 0.6504 [3.64] *** 0.6358 [4.26] *** 0.6084 [3.95] *** 0.5585 [3.19] *** 0.5152 [2.24] **
SUE 0.6647 [3.52] *** 0.5426 [3.48] *** 0.4615 [3.06] *** 0.9610 [5.94] *** 0.8052 [4.88] ***
Gross Profitability 0.5798 [3.31] *** 0.6178 [3.78] *** 0.5031 [3.17] *** 0.6362 [3.80] *** 0.4306 [2.33] **
Scaled NOA 1.1401 [5.34] *** 0.4899 [2.97] *** 0.3133 [1.94] * 0.5988 [3.71] *** 0.6507 [3.75] ***
Share Issuance 0.4006 [2.81] *** 0.5818 [4.08] *** 0.4666 [2.96] *** 0.6528 [3.66] *** 0.5649 [2.93] ***
Asset Growth 0.5854 [3.40] *** 0.3891 [2.70] *** 0.7570 [5.47] *** 0.7354 [4.23] *** 0.4320 [2.17] **
Capital Investment 0.5611 [3.17] *** 0.3701 [2.20] ** 0.3779 [2.38] ** 0.8187 [5.24] *** 0.6171 [3.39] ***
Investment Ratio 0.5025 [3.06] *** 0.5903 [3.59] *** 0.7694 [5.15] *** 0.7517 [4.50] *** 0.6091 [2.99] ***
External Financing 0.4274 [2.78] *** 0.3787 [2.31] ** 0.5534 [3.38] *** 0.5600 [3.11] *** 0.4572 [2.07] **
Z-Score 0.4821 [2.47] ** 0.3137 [2.07] ** 0.4994 [2.93] *** 0.5599 [3.24] *** 0.6645 [3.26] ***
Leverage 0.6900 [3.24] *** 0.6642 [3.96] *** 0.2939 [1.93] * 0.3526 [2.43] ** 0.6085 [3.73] ***
Illiquidity 0.6265 [4.67] *** 0.7351 [5.07] *** 0.7322 [4.72] *** 0.5024 [2.92] *** 0.7572 [3.88] ***
Earnings/Price 0.4072 [2.07] ** 0.4904 [2.70] *** 0.4286 [2.79] *** 0.3555 [2.60] *** 0.4838 [3.07] ***
Dividends/Price 0.7381 [4.77] *** 0.5341 [3.01] *** 0.6333 [3.89] *** 0.4584 [2.98] *** 0.5531 [3.09] ***
Cash Flow/Price 0.6512 [3.39] *** 0.2443 [1.39] 0.1678 [1.20] 0.5626 [3.64] *** 0.5413 [3.32] ***
V/P 0.6256 [3.17] *** 0.5141 [3.07] *** 0.4796 [3.31] *** 0.3204 [2.37] ** 0.5765 [3.61] ***
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
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Table 5: Mispricing Strategies and Other Anomalies (continued) 
 
Panel B: 8-Factor Alphas 
  
 
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
Beta 0.6886 [4.27] *** 0.3097 [2.07] ** 0.4516 [3.05] *** 0.2862 [1.64] 0.6512 [3.40] ***
Book/Market 0.3378 [1.55] 0.2685 [1.60] 0.5072 [3.16] *** 0.5523 [3.43] *** 0.6487 [3.87] ***
Market Capitalization 0.8367 [4.98] *** 0.6307 [3.87] *** 0.5310 [3.51] *** 0.4308 [2.89] *** 0.0996 [0.73]
Short-term Reversal 1.1781 [5.57] *** 0.7496 [4.76] *** 0.4981 [3.00] *** 0.1228 [0.79] 0.1553 [0.80]
Momentum 1.1272 [5.73] *** 0.7154 [4.24] *** 0.5269 [3.47] *** 0.5509 [3.44] *** 0.8120 [3.99] ***
Long-term Reversal 0.6404 [3.21] *** 0.7238 [4.37] *** 0.5980 [3.79] *** 0.4732 [2.85] *** 0.7741 [3.69] ***
Accruals 0.6838 [3.68] *** 0.6609 [4.29] *** 0.5600 [3.55] *** 0.5075 [2.79] *** 0.5488 [2.29] **
SUE 0.7341 [3.74] *** 0.4388 [2.74] *** 0.4129 [2.63] *** 0.9553 [5.69] *** 0.8121 [4.73] ***
Gross Profitability 0.6050 [3.31] *** 0.6803 [4.03] *** 0.5355 [3.26] *** 0.5844 [3.37] *** 0.4404 [2.29] **
Scaled NOA 0.9964 [4.52] *** 0.4326 [2.53] ** 0.2368 [1.41] 0.6645 [3.99] *** 0.6660 [3.73] ***
Share Issuance 0.5324 [3.70] *** 0.6795 [4.68] *** 0.4184 [2.56] ** 0.5655 [3.05] *** 0.5921 [2.95] ***
Asset Growth 0.5712 [3.18] *** 0.3960 [2.66] *** 0.7381 [5.16] *** 0.7528 [4.16] *** 0.4766 [2.30] **
Capital Investment 0.5835 [3.16] *** 0.4195 [2.41] ** 0.4096 [2.49] ** 0.8340 [5.18] *** 0.6116 [3.22] ***
Investment Ratio 0.4909 [2.90] *** 0.5186 [3.03] *** 0.7951 [5.11] *** 0.7865 [4.53] *** 0.6880 [3.25] ***
External Financing 0.4602 [2.91] *** 0.4708 [2.80] *** 0.5945 [3.49] *** 0.5369 [2.87] *** 0.4686 [2.04] **
Z-Score 0.5641 [2.78] *** 0.4070 [2.62] *** 0.6390 [3.71] *** 0.6327 [3.61] *** 0.7241 [3.50] ***
Leverage 0.6510 [2.95] *** 0.6288 [3.60] *** 0.3592 [2.31] ** 0.3126 [2.10] ** 0.7214 [4.34] ***
Illiquidity 0.5869 [4.21] *** 0.5666 [3.86] *** 0.6655 [4.17] *** 0.3623 [2.14] ** 0.7479 [3.68] ***
Earnings/Price 0.5953 [2.97] *** 0.5178 [2.75] *** 0.5627 [3.69] *** 0.4145 [3.04] *** 0.5812 [3.72] ***
Dividends/Price 0.7528 [4.68] *** 0.5842 [3.18] *** 0.6962 [4.16] *** 0.5296 [3.36] *** 0.6060 [3.30] ***
Cash Flow/Price 0.8311 [4.25] *** 0.2803 [1.54] 0.2665 [1.87] * 0.6796 [4.46] *** 0.6124 [3.72] ***
V/P 0.6177 [3.00] *** 0.5105 [2.93] *** 0.5016 [3.37] *** 0.3357 [2.46] ** 0.6082 [3.81] ***
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
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Table 6: Signal Additions and Deletions 
The table shows average industry-adjusted portfolio returns, as well as intercepts and t-statistics from time-series 
regressions of monthly industry-adjusted portfolio returns on 6 or 8 factors. Each row uses alternative constructions of 
the mispricing signal that vary with the set of accounting items used to obtain fair value. In Panel A, the accounting 
items listed in the first column are sequentially added as regressors in the fair value regression. In Panel B, the 
accounting items listed are sequentially dropped from the fair value regression. Panel C shows results separately for 
fair value regressions with balance sheet items as well as income statement and cash flow statement items. Stocks are 
sorted each month into quintiles based on the mispricing signal (M) and combined into equally-weighted portfolios. 
The table reports averages and regression statistics for the corresponding times series of return spreads between the 
most undervalued (Q5) and overvalued (Q1) stock quintiles. Regressors are Mkt_RF, SMB, HML, Mom, ST_Rev, 
LT_Rev, RMW and CMA, obtained from the data library of Kenneth French. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The sample consists of all ordinary common 
stocks of U.S. nonfinancial firms listed on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) with a share price at the 
beginning of the return month of not less than five dollars. The sample period is 3/1987-12/2012. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
Panel A: Signal Additions 
 
  
(continued)
Sequentially Added Variable Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
none (just regression intercept) -0.1172 [-0.70] -0.1559 [-1.20] -0.0718 [-0.54]
Assets - Total - Quarterly -0.0353 [-0.20] -0.0946 [-0.70] -0.0602 [-0.43]
Stockholders Equity - Total - Quarterly 0.1970 [1.01] 0.1862 [1.28] 0.0993 [0.66]
Invested Capital - Total - Quarterly 0.1884 [1.14] 0.1754 [1.34] 0.1702 [1.25]
Preferred/Preference Stock - Redeemable - Quarterly 0.1967 [1.19] 0.1901 [1.46] 0.1895 [1.40]
Stockholders Equity - TotalÂ  - Quarterly 0.1993 [1.21] 0.1957 [1.50] 0.1939 [1.43]
Property Plant and Equipment - Total (Net) - Quarterly 0.2045 [1.26] 0.1994 [1.50] 0.1852 [1.34]
Liabilities - Total - Quarterly 0.1989 [1.22] 0.1929 [1.45] 0.1805 [1.30]
Preferred/Preference Stock (Capital) - Total - Quarterly 0.1855 [1.12] 0.1778 [1.32] 0.1609 [1.14]
Common/Ordinary Equity - Total - Quarterly 0.1797 [1.09] 0.1744 [1.30] 0.1547 [1.11]
Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.2142 [1.39] 0.2341 [1.85] * 0.2252 [1.71] *
Long-Term Debt - Total - Quarterly 0.2347 [1.62] 0.2617 [2.12] ** 0.2838 [2.21] **
Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.2387 [1.65] * 0.2685 [2.13] ** 0.3015 [2.30] **
Current Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.2664 [1.77] * 0.2920 [2.27] ** 0.3313 [2.48] **
Cash and Short-Term Investments - Quarterly 0.2622 [1.72] * 0.3386 [2.46] ** 0.4658 [3.35] ***
Current Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.2777 [1.82] * 0.3449 [2.49] ** 0.4786 [3.43] ***
Accounts Payable - Quarterly 0.2660 [1.74] * 0.3407 [2.51] ** 0.4863 [3.59] ***
Dividends - Preferred/Preference - Quarterly 0.2479 [1.62] 0.3261 [2.40] ** 0.4679 [3.46] ***
Sales/Turnover (Net) - Quarterly 0.3711 [2.51] ** 0.4474 [3.49] *** 0.5579 [4.27] ***
Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations - Quarterly 0.3427 [2.33] ** 0.4293 [3.39] *** 0.5294 [4.09] ***
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Quarterly 0.5926 [4.03] *** 0.7419 [6.04] *** 0.7530 [5.87] ***
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Adjusted for Common Stock Equivalents - Quarterly 0.6329 [4.24] *** 0.7793 [6.26] *** 0.7825 [6.02] ***
Net Income (Loss) - Quarterly 0.6263 [4.24] *** 0.7643 [6.18] *** 0.7613 [5.90] ***
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common - Quarterly 0.6114 [4.21] *** 0.7445 [6.08] *** 0.7394 [5.79] ***
Pretax Income - Quarterly 0.6551 [4.49] *** 0.7815 [6.43] *** 0.7733 [6.10] ***
Income Taxes - Total - Quarterly 0.6058 [4.10] *** 0.7354 [5.95] *** 0.7356 [5.70] ***
Nonoperating Income (Expense)  - Quarterly 0.6329 [4.29] *** 0.7627 [6.37] *** 0.7258 [5.82] ***
Discontinued Operations - Quarterly 0.6463 [4.44] *** 0.7802 [6.55] *** 0.7495 [6.04] ***
Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) - Quarterly 0.4814 [3.19] *** 0.6232 [5.11] *** 0.6133 [4.83] ***
Industry-Adjusted Return 6-Factor Alpha 8-Factor Alpha
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Table 6: Signal Additions and Deletions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Signal Deletions 
 
  
 
 
Panel C: Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Items 
 
 
Sequentially Dropped Variable Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
none (signal with all variables) 0.4814 [3.19] *** 0.6232 [5.11] *** 0.6133 [4.83] ***
Assets - Total - Quarterly 0.4877 [3.23] *** 0.6287 [5.13] *** 0.6190 [4.86] ***
Stockholders Equity - Total - Quarterly 0.4634 [3.09] *** 0.6040 [4.92] *** 0.5907 [4.63] ***
Invested Capital - Total - Quarterly 0.4523 [3.01] *** 0.5876 [4.77] *** 0.5701 [4.45] ***
Preferred/Preference Stock - Redeemable - Quarterly 0.4338 [2.90] *** 0.5707 [4.65] *** 0.5516 [4.32] ***
Stockholders Equity - TotalÂ  - Quarterly 0.4222 [2.82] *** 0.5593 [4.57] *** 0.5446 [4.28] ***
Property Plant and Equipment - Total (Net) - Quarterly 0.4267 [2.86] *** 0.5604 [4.58] *** 0.5469 [4.29] ***
Liabilities - Total - Quarterly 0.3619 [2.35] ** 0.5094 [4.23] *** 0.4851 [3.86] ***
Preferred/Preference Stock (Capital) - Total - Quarterly 0.3785 [2.44] ** 0.5252 [4.31] *** 0.4974 [3.92] ***
Common/Ordinary Equity - Total - Quarterly 0.4058 [2.69] *** 0.5429 [4.54] *** 0.5202 [4.19] ***
Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.3963 [2.85] *** 0.5381 [4.47] *** 0.5721 [4.75] ***
Long-Term Debt - Total - Quarterly 0.3558 [2.37] ** 0.4874 [4.01] *** 0.4561 [3.69] ***
Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.4135 [2.72] *** 0.5192 [4.23] *** 0.4408 [3.49] ***
Current Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.3754 [2.45] ** 0.4689 [3.83] *** 0.3955 [3.14] ***
Cash and Short-Term Investments - Quarterly 0.3644 [2.14] ** 0.3796 [2.91] *** 0.2946 [2.18] **
Current Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly 0.3357 [1.98] ** 0.3504 [2.68] *** 0.2821 [2.08] **
Accounts Payable - Quarterly 0.3380 [2.01] ** 0.3507 [2.69] *** 0.2951 [2.17] **
Dividends - Preferred/Preference - Quarterly 0.3422 [2.01] ** 0.3566 [2.71] *** 0.3005 [2.20] **
Sales/Turnover (Net) - Quarterly 0.1898 [1.06] 0.2023 [1.56] 0.1097 [0.83]
Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations - Quarterly 0.1825 [1.03] 0.1971 [1.55] 0.1028 [0.78]
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Quarterly 0.1904 [1.08] 0.2149 [1.68] * 0.1210 [0.92]
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Adjusted for Common Stock Equivalents - Quarterly 0.1899 [1.07] 0.2126 [1.65] * 0.1121 [0.85]
Net Income (Loss) - Quarterly 0.1738 [0.98] 0.2034 [1.58] 0.1108 [0.83]
Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common - Quarterly 0.1427 [0.81] 0.1634 [1.27] 0.0839 [0.63]
Pretax Income - Quarterly 0.0067 [0.04] -0.0033 [-0.02] -0.0733 [-0.52]
Income Taxes - Total - Quarterly -0.0598 [-0.35] -0.0865 [-0.64] -0.0203 [-0.15]
Nonoperating Income (Expense)  - Quarterly -0.0607 [-0.35] -0.0889 [-0.66] -0.0413 [-0.30]
Discontinued Operations - Quarterly -0.0589 [-0.34] -0.0909 [-0.67] -0.0363 [-0.26]
Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) - Quarterly (just regression intercept) -0.1172 [-0.70] -0.1559 [-1.20] -0.0718 [-0.54]
Industry-Adjusted Return 6-Factor Alpha 8-Factor Alpha
Coef t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat
All Balance Sheet Items 0.2643 [1.73] * 0.3396 [2.50] ** 0.4852 [3.59] ***
All Income and Cash Flow Statement Items 0.3380 [2.01] ** 0.3507 [2.69] *** 0.2951 [2.17] **
Industry-Adjusted Return 6-Factor Alpha 8-Factor Alpha
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Appendix A: Discussion and Proof of Result in the Paper’s Introduction 
For a given date, let X* denote the NxK matrix of K accounting variables for each of N firms, with K < N. The 
accounting variables are reported (or transformed) at the firm level (i.e., earnings, dividends, depreciation, and book 
equity for the firm as a whole rather than per share), preserving the linearity of valuation.1 Thus, the accounting items 
that would be reported for an investment represented by the 1xN vector w in the N firms would be the 1xK vector wX*. 
More generally, for N distinct investments given by the rows of the NxN matrix W, the accounting statements of the 
investments would be given by the rows of the NxK matrix WX*. Thus, the N replicating investments must satisfy 
WX* = X*, (A1) 
and if the associated fair value estimates are further required to have average mispricing of zero, then W must 
satisfy 
WX = X, (A2) 
where the Nx(K+1) matrix X is X* augmented by a (first) column of 1’s.2 With entries that are functions of X, 
W’s rank deficiency leads to an infinite number of Ws that perfectly replicate each of the N targets’ accounting items 
while producing zero average mispricing. 
Proposition: There is a unique W of rank K+1 that is a function of X that produces zero average mispricing 
and also minimizes the mean-squared prediction error of any non-accounting attribute v of the targets. This is the one 
given by the idempotent projection matrix statisticians are so familiar from linear regression. 
                                                     
1 For example, the revenue of an investment that buys up 100 per cent of two firms is the sum of their revenues; the earnings of an 
investment that is 50% of investments A and B is the average of A and B’s earnings. Linearity in the portfolio mathematics of 
accounting items from firm combinations views these combinations as ETFs rather than as full-fledged mergers or acquisitions. 
Mergers often have synergies, and purchase accounting treatment allocates goodwill to the balance sheet items of the target. 
Such synergies and accounting treatments generally violate the linearity discussed here. 
2 This means that the N eigenvalues of W consist of K+1 “1”s and N-K-1 “0”s. Moreover, the eigenvectors of W associated with 
the eigenvalue of 1 consist of the cross-section of each of the K accounting variables and an N-vector of 1’s, as well as any linear 
combination of these eigenvectors. The 1 vector as eigenvector implies W’s “weights” sum to one, which is isomorphic to a 
market portfolio that is never estimated as mispriced. 
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Proof: Project any variable y not spanned by X onto X, which decomposes 
y = X(XTX)-1XTy + ε, (A3) 
with the vector ε orthogonal to X. Then, the quadratic minimization problem of finding W with eigenvectors X 
for eigenvalue 1 that minimizes the sum of squared errors simplifies to choosing the weight matrix W that minimizes 
[(X(XTX)-1XT – W)y + ε]T[(X(XTX)-1XT – W)y + ε], which trivially forces W to be the least squares projection matrix, 
irrespective of the value of the vector y. Since ε is orthogonal to X and mean zero in sample, it must be orthogonal to 
W if W is assumed to depend only on X. 
Setting 
W = X(XTX)-1XT (A4) 
predicts a cross-section of the attribute v, denoted P, that is the least squares prediction, i.e., 
P = Wv = X(XTX)-1XTv. (A5) 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
The table shows the variable name (or mnemonic), the description (or construction) of the data item, as well as the 
source (database). CRSP and Compustat PIT are from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
 
 
(continued)  
Variable Definition Source
ATQH Assets - Total - Quarterly Compustat
DVPQH Dividends - Preferred/Preference - Quarterly Compustat
SALEQH Sales/Turnover (Net) - Quarterly Compustat
SEQQH Stockholders Equity - Total - Quarterly Compustat
IBQH Income Before Extraordinary Items - Quarterly Compustat
NIQH Net Income (Loss) - Quarterly Compustat
XIDOQH Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations - Quarterly Compustat
IBADJQH Income Before Extraordinary Items - Adjusted for Common Stock Equivalents - Quarterl Compustat
IBCOMQH Income Before Extraordinary Items - Available for Common - Quarterly Compustat
ICAPTQH Invested Capital - Total - Quarterly Compustat
TEQQH Stockholders Equity - TotalÂ  - Quarterly Compustat
PSTKRQH Preferred/Preference Stock - Redeemable - Quarterly Compustat
PPENTQH Property Plant and Equipment - Total (Net) - Quarterly Compustat
CEQQH Common/Ordinary Equity - Total - Quarterly Compustat
PSTKQH Preferred/Preference Stock (Capital) - Total - Quarterly Compustat
DLTTQH Long-Term Debt - Total - Quarterly Compustat
PIQH Pretax Income - Quarterly Compustat
TXTQH Income Taxes - Total - Quarterly Compustat
NOPIQH Nonoperating Income (Expense)  - Quarterly Compustat
AOQH Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly Compustat
LTQH Liabilities - Total - Quarterly Compustat
DOQH Discontinued Operations - Quarterly Compustat
LOQH Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly Compustat
CHEQH Cash and Short-Term Investments - Quarterly Compustat
ACOQH Current Assets - Other - Total - Quarterly Compustat
DVQH Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) - Quarterly Compustat
LCOQH Current Liabilities - Other - Total - Quarterly Compustat
APQH Accounts Payable - Quarterly Compustat
SharePrice Stock price (in dollar and cents) CRSP
Number of Shares Outstanding Number of shares outstanding (in millions) CRSP
Return Monthly Stock Return CRSP
Beta Annual Market Beta CRSP
Industry Classification 38 industries Ken French website
Industry Portfolios Monthly returns on 38 industry portfolios Ken French website
Mkt_RF Monthly market index return net of risk-free rate Ken French website
SMB Monthly Small Minus Big (SMB) portfolio return Ken French website
HML Monthly High Minus Low (HML) portfolio return Ken French website
Mom Monthly Momentum portfolio return Ken French website
ST_Rev Monthly Short-term reversal portfolio return Ken French website
LT_Rev Monthly long-term reversal portfolio return Ken French website
CMA Monthly investment factor Ken French website
RMW Monthly profitability factor Ken French website
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
 
Variable Definition Source
SUE Quarterly earnings surprise based on a rolling seasonal random walk model (Livnat and 
Mendenhall, 2006, page 185) 
Accruals Accruals = [NOA(t)-NOA(t-1)]/NOA(t-1), where NOA(t) = Operating Assets (t) - 
Operating Liabilities (t). Operating Assets is calculated as total assets (ATQ) less cash 
and short-term investments (CHEQ). Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets 
(ATQ) less total debt (DLCQ and DLTTQ) less book value of total common and 
preferred equity (CEQQ and PSTKQ) less minority interest (MIBTQ) (Richardson et 
al., 2001, p. 22)
Gross Profitability (Revenue(REVTQ) - Cost of Goods Sold(COGSQ))/Total Assets(ATQ) (Novy-Marx 
2013)
Market Capitalization Stock Market Capitalization of Common Stock, calculated as product of Share 
Price(PRC) * Number of Shares Outstanding(SHROUT)
Book/Market (Book Equity(CEQQ) + Deferred Taxes Balance Sheet(TXDBQ))/MarketCapitalization
Mispricing Percentage (M) -1 * Residual/ MarketCapitalization
Short-term Reversal Return in prior month
Momentum Return in prior year excluding prior month
Long-term Reversal Return in prior five years excluding prior year
Scaled NOA Scaled NOA (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang, 2004)
Share Issuance Share issuance (Daniel and Titman, 2006)
Asset Growth Asset growth (Cooper, Gulen and Schill, 2008)
Capital Investment Abnormal capital investment (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004)
Investment Ratio Investment ratio (Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang, 2008)
External Financing External financing (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2006)
Z-Score Z-Score (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003)
Leverage Leverage (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003)
Illiquidity Illiquidity (Amihud, 2002)
Earnings/Price Earnings/Price (Penman, Richardson, Riggoni, and Tuna 2014)
Dividends/Price Dividends/Price (Fama and French, 1992)
Cash Flow/Price Cash flow/Price (Hou, Karolyi, and Kho, 2011)
V/P Value/Price (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999)
